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INTRODUCTION
Environmental law is becoming ever more centralized. In the
United States, state and local pollution laws have been eclipsed by
federal regulation.1 In the European Community, and to a lesser
degree under the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA), national controls have been supplemented by regional
regulation.2 And the growing importance of treaties regulating
particular aspects of the global environment has reinforced calls
for more general regimes of international environmental regulation.3
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1. See generally Robert V. Percival, Environmental Federalism: Historical Roots and
Contemporary Models, 54 MD. L. REV. 1141 (1995) (tracing the growth of the federal
role over time).
2. See ECKARD REHBINDER & RICHARD STEWART, 2 INTEGRATION THROUGH
LAW: EUROPE AND THE AMERICAN FEDERAL EXPERIENCE, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTEC-
TION POLICY 57–104 (1985) (tracing evolution of European Union environmental law);
Steve Charnovitz, The NAFTA Environmental Side Agreement: Implications for Environ-
mental Cooperation, Trade Policy, and American Treatymaking, 8 TEMP. INT’L & COMP.
L.J. 257, 260–71 (1994) (discussing the North American Agreement on Environmental
Cooperation, the environmental side agreement to NAFTA).
3. See, e.g., Robert W. Hahn & Kenneth R. Richards, The Internationalization of
Environmental Regulation, 30 HARV. INT’L L.J. 421, 423–27 (1989) (discussing the forces
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One inevitably given justification for this centralizing trend is
that pollution is a transboundary phenomenon.4 Air and water
pollution, and to a lesser extent groundwater contamination, can
cross political boundaries. Moreover, pollution that originates in
one state and spills over into another is very difficult for either
jurisdiction to regulate effectively. The source state may be reluc-
tant to impose expensive controls on local industry when the ben-
efits will inure to political outsiders. The affected state may not be
able to obtain jurisdiction over actors in the source state, or, if it
can obtain jurisdiction, the affected state may have trouble en-
forcing any decree it enters. Given the inherent difficulties in
regulation by any single state, transboundary pollution would seem
to present a clear case for shifting regulatory authority from local
to more centralized levels of governance.5
When one examines existing environmental regimes more
closely, however, a paradox emerges. Notwithstanding the broad
general trend toward centralized regulatory authority in environ-
mental law, and the widespread invocation of transboundary pollu-
tion as a justification for that trend, little meaningful regulation of
transboundary pollution actually exists.
The customary international law of transboundary pollution,
for example, is based on a very small number of inconclusive
adjudications and a mountain of official declarations and unofficial
driving the internationalization of environmental issues).
4. See, e.g., ALLEN L. SPRINGER, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF POLLUTION: PRO-
TECTING THE GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT IN A WORLD OF SOVEREIGN STATES 13 (1983)
(stating that the “first type of internationally significant environmental change . . . [is]
transboundary pollution”); Daniel C. Esty, Revitalizing Environmental Federalism, 95
MICH. L. REV. 570, 593, 626–27 (1996) (“The presence of transboundary harm demands
some form of overarching governmental action across the scope of the harm.”); Richard
L. Revesz, Federalism and Interstate Environmental Externalities, 144 U. PA. L. REV.
2341, 2342–43 (1996) (describing “interstate externalities” as a primary reason for environ-
mental regulation at the federal level); Richard B. Stewart, Pyramids of Sacrifice? Prob-
lems of Federalism in Mandating State Implementation of National Environmental Policy,
86 YALE L.J. 1196, 1226–30 (1977) (arguing that the federal government should have
power to implement controls to prevent spillover effects).
5. Even commentators hostile to centralization of environmental law generally rec-
ognize an exception for transboundary pollution. See, e.g., Henry N. Butler & Jonathan
R. Macey, Externalities and the Matching Principle: The Case for Reallocating Environ-
mental Regulatory Authority, 14 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 23, 33 (1996) (noting that
transboundary pollution is an interstate externality providing strong economic justification
for federal intervention); Jacques LeBoeuf, The Economics of Federalism and the Proper
Scope of the Federal Commerce Power, 31 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 555, 570–71 (1994) (simi-
lar position).
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commentary seeking to make something out of them.6 When one
turns to international treaties, the situation is only slightly better.
Although there are over 200 international agreements dealing with
environmental matters,7 only a few deal specifically with trans-
boundary pollution. And with isolated exceptions, the transbound-
ary treaties that do exist are largely devoted to encouraging infor-
mation-sharing and consultation, rather than establishing liability
regimes or prescribing substantive limitations on polluting activity.
One would think that the situation must be different within a
mature federal system like the United States, where transboundary
pollution from one state to another has long been recognized as a
problem.8 In fact, the law that governs pollution crossing state
lines in the United States is nearly as undeveloped as the interna-
tional law governing transboundary pollution. During the first
three decades of the twentieth century, the United States Supreme
Court began the process of articulating a federal common law of
interstate pollution in a string of cases in which the Court exer-
cised original jurisdiction.9 More recently, however, the Court has
engaged in a series of gyrations about the source of law that ap-
plies to transboundary nuisances,10 and in so doing has hindered
the development of a coherent body of decisional law.
Perhaps more surprisingly, the federal regulatory statutes that
one would expect to address transboundary pollution—principally
the Clean Air Act11 and the Clean Water Act12—have them-
selves largely failed to regulate transboundary pollution. The
Clean Air Act prohibits emission activity in one state that contrib-
utes significantly to other states’ noncompliance with air quality
standards,13 but no state has ever secured relief under this provi-
sion.14 The Clean Water Act has been interpreted by the Envi-
6. See infra text accompanying notes 108–22.
7. See Daniel Barstow Magraw, International Law and Pollution, in INTERNATIONAL
LAW AND POLLUTION 12 (1991).
8. See Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230, 236 (1907) (recounting
Georgia’s complaint regarding air pollution emanating from copper smelters in Tennes-
see); Missouri v. Illinois, 200 U.S. 496, 497 (1906) (detailing Missouri’s claim that Illinois
polluted the Mississippi River by discharging raw sewage into the river).
9. See infra text accompanying notes 27–69.
10. See infra text accompanying notes 77–81.
11. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7671q (1994).
12. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1387 (1994).
13. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7410(a)(2)(D)(i), 7426.
14. See infra note 143 and accompanying text.
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ronmental Protection Agency (EPA) as prohibiting discharges in
one state that cause detectable violations of water quality stan-
dards in another state.15 Again, however, there are very few re-
ported cases in which this interpretation has been enforced.16
In both international and domestic law, therefore, one sees a
failure to develop an effective central regime for regulating
transboundary pollution. Case-by-case approaches based on cus-
tomary international law or American common law have failed to
address the problem in a sustained fashion, and as a consequence
no specific legal norms have been generated. Enacted law, whether
bi- or multilateral international treaties or federal statutes, has also
proven to be largely ineffectual.
This Article asks why regulation of transboundary pollution
remains so underdeveloped in a world where environmental policy
in general is becoming increasingly centralized. In Part I, I canvass
in greater detail the disparity between official norms and legal
reality in the regulation of transboundary pollution. The official
norms of customary international law and U.S. statutory law are
essentially the same: the source state is held strictly liable for all
transboundary pollution that causes “significant” or “serious” harm
in another state.17 Yet, when one examines the actual legal re-
gimes established to address transboundary pollution—whether in
international law or in the federal system of the United States—
one finds that this norm is almost never invoked or enforced. The
only meaningful, centralized regulation of transboundary pollution
is found in agreements in which two or more contiguous states
agree on specific pollution control measures. Such agreements are
also rare, however, and consequently transboundary pollution as
such goes largely unregulated.
In Part II, I ask whether certain structural features common
to transboundary pollution disputes account for this failure. A
transboundary pollution control regime will emerge only if its
benefits exceed the costs of its establishment and maintenance.
There are a number of reasons why the benefits may fall short of
the costs. Of particular significance is the sharply conflicting na-
15. See Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 503 U.S. 91, 104–05 (1992) (stating that the EPA has
authority to mandate compliance by one state with respect to water quality standards of
another state).
16. See infra notes 152–56 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 22, 109.
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ture of the interests of the disputing parties. The source state ob-
tains the benefits of the polluting activity and externalizes some of
the costs of pollution to the affected state; the affected state bears
the costs of pollution but enjoys few or none of the benefits of
polluting. Thus, the source state has no incentive to participate in
a regime of centralized regulation unless it receives compensation
of some sort from the affected state. Devising such a scheme is
awkward and expensive. The only advantageous structural feature
of transboundary pollution disputes lies in the fact that, typically,
only a small number of states (often two) are involved; this should
facilitate the negotiation of Coasean bargains.18 It is this feature
that explains why agreements negotiated among a small number of
states are the most commonly-observed regulatory response to
transboundary pollution.
In Part III, I consider the additional possibility that the failure
of transboundary pollution regulation is partly a function of the
official legal norm of strict liability that supposedly governs these
disputes. If, as the survey in Part II indicates, Coasean bargains
present the most promising avenue for regulating transboundary
pollution, legal norms could disrupt bargaining over transboundary
pollution in several ways. Such norms could lead to uncertainty
about the outcome if the parties fail to reach an agreement. More-
over, these norms could create opportunities for states to take
threatening positions in an attempt to bargain strategically. And
finally, they could allow states to conceal information about how
they evaluate the costs and benefits of collective action. I argue
that the norm of strict liability, as it operates in practice, generates
all three problems, and that this norm thus may have unintention-
ally contributed to the general failure to establish a system of
collective action.
In Part IV, I return to the original jurisdiction decisions ren-
dered by the United States Supreme Court in the first three de-
cades of this century. Although it is possible to read these deci-
sions as adopting a universal norm of strict liability for trans-
18. A Coasean bargain, so named of course for Ronald Coase, is an agreement to
rearrange legal entitlements relative to the way they are assigned by law. See Ronald H.
Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 2–8 (1960). The usual assumption
is that if transaction costs are low, such bargains will occur as a matter of course. See
id.; see also Robert Cooter, The Cost of Coase, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 15–20 (1982) (dis-
cussing the plausibility of this assumption).
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boundary pollution, I argue that the decisions are better read as
endorsing a particularized search for equitable solutions to each
dispute. Moreover, some of these decisions adopt a norm of reci-
procity as a central element for identifying the appropriate equita-
ble solution; specifically, they invoke the equitable maxim of
“clean hands”— that one who seeks equity must do equity—as a
justification for denying relief to states complaining of pollution
emanating from other states. The maxim suggests a “golden rule,”
to the effect that the affected state is entitled to be treated by the
source state in the same way as the affected state treats its own
citizens. Under such a rule, the critical question in a trans-
boundary pollution suit becomes whether the affected state has
been exposed to pollution to a degree that would give rise to a
regulatory response if the pollution had been introduced by a
private citizen in the affected state.
In Part V, I will advance some reasons why such a golden
rule, operating in tandem with another golden rule that would
require source states to treat affected states as well as the source
state treats its own citizens, provides a more satisfactory starting
point for overcoming the structural barriers to the effective regula-
tion of transboundary pollution. These golden rules of interstate
behavior build on a fortuitous aspect of transboundary pollution
not present in private nuisance disputes: each antagonist is at once
a party to the dispute and a regulator of similar disputes. The
golden rules capitalize on this feature by insisting that the source
state simply respect a normative judgment that it or the affected
state have already demonstrated they are prepared to impose on
themselves in their capacity as regulators. I argue that this more
context-specific norm would be superior to a universal norm of
strict liability on all fronts: it would generate more predictable
assessments of the requirements of the law; it would minimize the
opportunities for strategic bargaining; and it would force the par-
ties to disclose information about their true evaluations of the
costs and benefits of regulation.
I do not claim that the golden rules offer a panacea for
transboundary pollution. The very real structural obstacles to ef-
fective regulation discussed in Part II will continue to frustrate
most proposals for collective action. Furthermore, there are cir-
cumstances in which the golden rules would not improve upon
strict liability—for example, where the polluting activity is novel
and has not given rise to any tradition of regulation in either
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that pollution emanating from a source state has caused legally
cognizable injury in an affected state;22 and 3) the question of the
standard of care, that is, whether a source state that has caused
such injury will be held strictly liable, or will be held liable only if
it is shown to have acted unreasonably or negligently. In addition,
that is the question of choosing an appropriate remedy: if the
affected state establishes liability on the part of the source state, is
it entitled only to advance notice and consultation about trans-
boundary pollution, can it demand monetary reparations, or can it
block the continued operation of the polluting facilities in the
source state?
Currently, there is a fairly high degree of consensus under
both international customary law and U.S. statutory law about the
answers to the first three of these questions: a source state is
legally responsible for all transboundary pollution emanating from
sources within its jurisdiction; a source state is liable only when
such pollution is clearly proven to cause significant harm in the af-
fected state; and once the threshold of significant harm is crossed,
a source state is strictly liable for such harm. The appropriate
remedy under international law is a matter of some disagreement.
Some commentators insist that international law provides for
awards of monetary damages for proven transboundary pollu-
tion.23 Others argue that a right to advance notification and con-
sultation is all that can be demanded.24 Within the American fed-
eral system, the appropriate remedy is mandatory relief in the
22. Whether an injury is legally cognizable has usually been expressed in terms of
the severity of the harm, such as whether the harm is “substantial,” “significant,” or
“serious.” See, e.g., New York v. New Jersey, 256 U.S. 296, 309 (1921) (“serious magni-
tude”); see also infra note 109 (quoting sources using similar terms). A closely related
question concerns what types of injuries may be compensated: only those injuries readily
translatable into monetary terms, or more intangible interests, such as a threat to the
ecosystem or psychological harm in the form of fear or apprehension about the long-term
effects of such pollution. See Linda A. Malone, The Chernobyl Accident: A Case Study in
International Law Regulating State Responsibility for Transboundary Nuclear Pollution, 12
COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 203, 208–12, 239–40 (1987) (discussing the difficulty of recovering
for intangible damages following the Chernobyl disaster, and arguing for reform); see also
Alfred P. Rubin, Pollution by Analogy: The Trail Smelter Arbitration, 50 OR. L. REV.
259 (1971) (arguing that the tribunal’s decision in the Trail Smelter Arbitration to limit
damages to provable monetary loss was incorrect). I do not consider this issue here.
23. See SPRINGER, supra note 4, at 135–140; PATRICIA W. BIRNIE & ALAN E.
BOYLE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE ENVIRONMENT 152–53 (1994).
24. See CHRISTOPHER D. STONE, THE GNAT IS OLDER THAN MAN: GLOBAL ENVI-
RONMENT AND HUMAN AGENDA 55–57 (1993).
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form of an administrative order forcing the offending facilities in
the source state to abate their pollution in order to eliminate the
illegal transboundary effect.25
To understand how these consensus views developed, it is
useful to begin with a brief review of the cases in which the U.S.
Supreme Court exercised its original jurisdiction in the early years
of the twentieth century. These decisions reflect the views of the
United States’ most prestigious tribunal and the most prominent
judge (Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.) ever to consider the
problem of transboundary pollution. As we shall see, the Court’s
decisions constitute the ultimate source for the current content of
the international customary law. A brief introduction to these
decisions is also appropriate, given that later in the article I will
offer a revisionist interpretation of the Court’s opinions.
1. The Supreme Court’s Original Jurisdiction Decisions. Since
its founding, the Supreme Court has exercised original jurisdiction
in a variety of cases. The most common have been suits between
states to establish boundary lines or title to specific lands.26 In
1900, an original complaint was filed with the Court alleging that
pollution emanating from one state was causing a public nuisance
in another state.27 In the ensuing thirty years or so, the Court
exercised its original jurisdiction in five cases dealing with
complaints about transboundary pollution.28 The most important
25. See Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7426(c) (1994); see also Arkansas v. Oklahoma,
503 U.S. 91, 95–97, 110–12 (1992) (summarizing the EPA’s interpretation of the Clean
Water Act).
26. See Note, The Original Jurisdiction of the United States Supreme Court, 11 STAN.
L. REV. 665, 701–19 (1959) (listing all Supreme Court original jurisdiction cases and their
causes of action).
27. See Missouri v. Illinois, 180 U.S. 208, 208–218 (1901) (reproducing complaint).
One earlier case alleged that a low-lying bridge on a navigable river was a public nui-
sance because it obstructed river traffic. See Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge
Co., 54 U.S. (13 How.) 518, 557 (1851). This dispute was resolved when Congress adopt-
ed legislation specifically authorizing maintenance of the bridge as a lawful post-road. See
Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 421, 429 (1855).
28. See New Jersey v. City of New York, 283 U.S. 473, 476–77 (1931); New Jersey
v. New York, 283 U.S. 336, 341–42 (1931); New York v. New Jersey, 256 U.S. 296, 298
(1921); Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230, 236 (1907); Missouri v. Illinois,
200 U.S. 496, 517 (1906). The Court considered two other cases during this era involving
allegations that changes in interstate water flows had caused what was in effect an inter-
state nuisance. See Wisconsin v. Illinois, 278 U.S. 367, 399–400 (1929) (dealing with the
diversion of water from Lake Michigan to the Chicago River, which was alleged to lower
the level of the Great Lakes to the injury of lower riparian states); North Dakota v.
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of these decisions were the first two, Missouri v. Illinois29 and
Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co.30
Missouri’s complaint against Illinois and its political subdivi-
sion, the Sanitary District of Chicago, challenged an ingenious plan
to reverse the direction of the Chicago River, which previously
had flowed into Lake Michigan, and make it flow instead away
from the Lake, connecting through various canals and rivers until
it eventually emptied into the Mississippi River forty-three miles
above St. Louis.31 Before the plan was launched, 1,500 pounds of
raw sewage were discharged daily into the Chicago River, jeop-
ardizing the city’s water supply.32 The District’s plan would have
solved Chicago’s contaminated water supply problem by sending
the raw sewage downstate in the direction of St. Louis.
In a preliminary decision rendered in 1901, the Court held
that it had the authority to entertain and adjudicate the action.33
Missouri was a proper plaintiff, because it was suing as parens
patriae to abate a public nuisance which was allegedly jeopardizing
its citizens’ welfare.34 Illinois was a proper defendant, because it
had the power to enjoin its agent, the Sanitary District of Chicago,
from committing such an alleged public nuisance.35 Justice Shiras
expressly analogized the situation of the two states to that of two
nations under international law:
If Missouri were an independent and sovereign State all must
admit that she could seek a remedy by negotiation, and, that
failing, by force. Diplomatic powers and the right to make war
having been surrendered to the general government, it was to be
expected that upon the latter would be devolved the duty of
providing a remedy and that remedy, we think, is found in the
constitutional provisions we are considering [providing for origi-
Minnesota, 263 U.S. 365, 371–72 (1923) (concerning a dispute over transboundary flooding
of river).
29. 200 U.S. 496.
30. 206 U.S. 230.
31. See Missouri, 200 U.S. at 517.
32. See id.
33. See Missouri, 180 U.S. at 241.
34. See id.
35. See id. at 242. Three Justices dissented on the ground that there was insufficient
basis for attributing the alleged nuisance to acts taken by the State of Illinois, rather
than the Sanitary District. See id. at 249–50 (Fuller, C.J., dissenting, joined by Harlan &
White, JJ.).
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nal suits in the Supreme Court in disputes between two
states].36
In so ruling, the Court in effect resolved the attribution question:
Illinois, the source state, would be legally responsible if pollution
emanating from its territory was found to cause an actionable
public nuisance in Missouri.37
After an extensive factual investigation, the matter returned to
the Court for decision on the merits some five years later.38 Writ-
ing for a unanimous Court, Justice Holmes held that Missouri had
failed to prove an actionable public nuisance, and the bill of com-
plaint was dismissed.39
Holmes’ opinion covers three subjects: the source of law gov-
erning the dispute, the legal principles to be gleaned from that
law, and the application of those principles to the facts. The dis-
cussion of the first point is interesting, but a detailed consideration
of it would take us too far afield. Essentially, Holmes concluded
that the only possible source of law was the provision of the Con-
stitution granting jurisdiction to the Court over such disputes, and
the necessity of applying legal rules which would not be subject to
revision by the legislatures of either state.40 Holmes clearly did
36. Id. at 241.
37. This aspect of the decision was reaffirmed in Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406
U.S. 91, 94–95 (1972).
38. See Missouri v. Illinois, 200 U.S. 496 (1906).
39. See id. at 526.
40. See id. at 519–20. A federal court’s duty to decide a case properly within its
jurisdiction, even if there is no applicable rule of decision supplied by federal or state
law, probably provides the strongest justification for recognizing “federal common law.”
See Steven D. Smith, Courts, Creativity, and the Duty to Decide a Case, 1985 U. ILL. L.
REV. 573, 581–82. But see Thomas W. Merrill, The Judicial Prerogative, 12 PACE L. REV.
327, 352–56 (1992) (questioning how often this rationale applies).
The need to resort to federal common law in the transboundary pollution context
raised an even more vexing question, however, because under the Constitution as it was
then interpreted, it was doubtful that Congress had the power to legislate on the subject
of interstate water pollution. Cf. Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 86–97 (1907) (indicat-
ing unanimously that Congress had no power to apportion waters in an interstate river,
as opposed to regulating use of the river in the interest of navigation). Thus, the Court
was placed in the uncomfortable position of announcing rules of decision which no legis-
lative body could overturn. See Missouri, 200 U.S. at 520 (observing that a judicial deci-
sion in an area in which Congress had no power to regulate would be largely “irrevoca-
ble”). This particular difficulty was of course eventually overcome, as the Court came to
view the powers of Congress much more broadly. By the time transboundary pollution
disputes returned to the Court in the early 1970s, it was taken as a matter of course
that Congress could revise decisions based on the federal common law of interstate pollu-
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not like the implication that the Court, in such cases, “takes the
place of [the] legislature,” and for that reason he said that the
Court should proceed with “great and serious caution.”41 In ef-
fect, doubts about the lawmaking authority of the Court were
translated into a high burden of proof for the plaintiff state: “Be-
fore this court ought to intervene the case should be of serious
magnitude, clearly and fully proved, and the principle to be ap-
plied should be one which the court is prepared deliberately to
maintain against all considerations on the other side.”42
Holmes then turned to the “principles of law” to be applied.
The discussion of this point is set forth in one paragraph, which in
the finest Holmesian style is at once richly suggestive and madden-
ingly oblique.43 Holmes focused on the established practice along
the Mississippi of permitting the discharge of untreated sewage
into the river. This conventional practice, he stated, “offers a stan-
dard to which the defendant has the right to appeal;”44 it also
made it especially difficult to determine whether any injury was
caused by sewage emanating from Chicago, as opposed to other
discharges of untreated sewage, including those from Missouri
cities.45
With this abbreviated discussion of the applicable legal princi-
ples, Holmes turned to the conflicting evidence submitted by the
parties. The issue had narrowed to the question of whether ty-
phoid bacteria contained in the sewage from Chicago were capable
of surviving the arduous journey to St. Louis, some 357 river miles
away.46 The proofs developed by the parties make for fascinating
reading, but were essentially inconclusive.47 In the end, Holmes
concluded that Missouri’s evidence “falls so far below the allega-
tions of the bill that it is not brought within the principles hereto-
fore established in the cause.”48
The question remains, however, just what were those princi-
ples? Generally speaking, ensuing courts and commentators have
tion. See Illinois, 406 U.S. at 107.
41. 200 U.S. at 519, 520.
42. Id. at 521.
43. I will give further consideration to the import of this paragraph infra Part IV.
44. 200 U.S. at 522.
45. See id.
46. See id. at 523.
47. See id. at 523–25.
48. Id. at 526.
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interpreted the cautionary remark that the case must be “of seri-
ous magnitude, clearly and fully proved,”49 together with the ex-
tensive discussion about whether the sewage dumped in the Illinois
River had resulted in an increase of typhoid in St. Louis, to mean
that the plaintiff state must prove by “clear and convincing evi-
dence” that it has suffered actual injury.50 This conventional read-
ing of Missouri v. Illinois is, in turn, the source of the second
element of the consensus about the norms that govern trans-
boundary pollution disputes; namely that state liability for trans-
boundary pollution attaches only when such pollution is clearly
proven to cause significant harm in the affected state.
Just one year after Missouri v. Illinois, the Court was con-
fronted with another notable transboundary pollution case, Georgia
v. Tennessee Copper Co.51 For some years, three copper smelters
operating in eastern Tennessee had employed a method of roasting
ore in open piles. The roasting method emitted large quantities of
sulphur fumes, damaging vegetation on nearby Tennessee hills and
causing headaches and other physical symptoms among residents
living in the vicinity.52 This gave rise to state court litigation in
which the Tennessee Supreme Court upheld a finding that the
operations were a nuisance, but, after balancing the equities, de-
nied injunctive relief and awarded the plaintiffs only modest dam-
ages.53
Meanwhile, the smelters turned from open pile to oven roast-
ing, and one company located its oven very close to the Georgia
state line.54 When Georgia residents began complaining of the
same injuries as the Tennessee plaintiffs, Georgia filed an original
action in the Supreme Court on their behalf, naming the copper
companies as defendants.55 Georgia sought an injunction against
continued operation of the ovens.56
49. Id. at 521.
50. New York v. New Jersey, 256 U.S. 296, 309 (1921); see also Ann Woolhandler &
Michael G. Collins, State Standing, 81 VA. L. REV. 387, 453 (1995) (observing that the
heightened standard of proof is necessary in suits between states, although not in suits
between private parties).
51. 206 U.S. 230 (1907).
52. See Madison v. Ducktown Sulphur, Copper & Iron Co., 83 S.W. 658, 659–60
(Tenn. 1904).
53. See id.
54. See Memorandum of Argument for Complainant Upon Final Hearing at 1–5,
Tennessee Copper, 206 U.S. 230; Tennessee Cooper, 206 U.S at 238.
55. See 206 U.S. at 239.
56. See Original Bill of Complaint at 15–16, Tennessee Copper, 206 U.S. 230. The
FILE:C:\WP51\DLJ\MERRILL.PP Dec 12/06/97 Sat 10:53am
944 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 46 :931
Justice Holmes again wrote for the Court. In both tone and
outcome, the decision was very different from Missouri v. Illinois.
Holmes again stressed the differences between a suit by a state
and a suit between private parties, but now he emphasized the
state’s right as a “quasi-sovereign” to be protected from unwanted
intrusions upon its territory.57 The four-page opinion devoted
most of its consideration to whether it was appropriate to balance
the equities in deciding whether to award injunctive relief for
transboundary air pollution.58 Concluding that “[t]his court has
not quite the same freedom to balance the harm that will be done
by an injunction against that of which the plaintiff complains, that
it would have in deciding between two subjects of a single political
power,”59 Holmes found that an injunction would be the proper
remedy, given a proven violation of the principles recognized in
Missouri v. Illinois.60
As to what those principles were and why they had been
shown to be satisfied, Holmes offered “but a few words.”61 He
observed that it was not disputed that the defendants emitted sul-
phur fumes that were “carried by the wind great distances and
over great tracts of Georgia land.”62 Without pausing “to go into
details immaterial to the suit,” Holmes announced that “we are
satisfied by a preponderance of evidence that the sulphurous
fumes cause and threaten damage on so considerable a scale to
the forests and vegetable life, if not to health, within the plaintiff
State as to make out a case within the requirements of Missouri v.
Illinois.”63 There followed these somewhat mysterious words:
“Whether Georgia by insisting upon this claim is doing more harm
than good to her own citizens is for her to determine. The possi-
case was originally filed in 1905, and the parties compiled a voluminous record at that
time on the propriety of injunctive relief. Before the Court could rule, the defendants
represented that they would install tall stacks on the ovens so as to minimize the harm.
Georgia then voluntarily dismissed its complaint. The results of this modification proved
unsatisfactory, however, and Georgia refiled its complaint two years later. See Tennessee
Copper, 206 U.S. at 239. The parties thereupon agreed that the Court could decide the
issue on the original record compiled in 1905. See id. at 236.
57. 206 U.S. at 237.
58. See id. at 237–39.
59. Id. at 238.
60. See id. at 239.
61. Id. at 238.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 238–39 (citation omitted).
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ble disaster to those outside the State must be accepted as a con-
sequence of her standing upon her extreme rights.”64
Needless to say, Tennessee Copper is in some tension with
Missouri v. Illinois. Both decisions focus on the sensitivities of the
Court’s role in adjudicating transboundary pollution disputes impli-
cating the interests of two “quasi-sovereign” states. However, while
Missouri v. Illinois seems to hold that these concerns require great
caution before intruding upon the practices of the source state,65
Tennessee Copper seems to hold that these concerns translate into
the prerogative of the affected state to “stand upon . . . extreme
rights” even if this means “possible disaster to those outside the
State.”66
Subsequent decisions and commentary have sought to recon-
cile the two decisions by positing that they establish a twofold
legal regime.67 First, Missouri v. Illinois adopts a high threshold
for source state liability, requiring clear and convincing proof of
significant injury in the affected state.68 Second, Tennessee Copper
provides that once this threshold is crossed, a rule of strict liability
applies and the affected state is entitled to automatic injunctive
relief against the continuance of such pollution.69 Tennessee Cop-
per, according to this view, thus answers the last two of the four
questions posed by transboundary pollution: it establishes that the
standard of care is one of strict liability and that the preferred
remedy is automatic injunctive relief.
Although the Court decided three more transboundary pollu-
tion cases in the next two decades,70 these decisions add little to
the understanding of the elusive “principles” applied in Missouri v.
Illinois and Tennessee Copper.71 Starting in the 1940s, the
states—with the Court’s encouragement72—began to turn to inter-
64. Id. at 239.
65. See Missouri v. Illinois, 200 U.S. 496, 525–26 (1906).
66. Tennessee Copper, 206 U.S. at 239.
67. See, e.g., North Dakota v. Minnesota, 263 U.S. 365, 373–74 (1924); Trail Smelter
(U.S. v. Can.), 3 R.I.A.A. 1905, 1938 (1949); Malone, supra note 22, at 209–10; William
A. Nitze, Acid Rain: A United States Perspective, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLLU-
TION, supra note 7, at 329, 338.
68. See supra notes 49–50 and accompanying text.
69. Tennessee Copper, 206 U.S. at 239.
70. See New Jersey v. City of New York, 283 U.S. 473 (1931); New Jersey v. New
York, 283 U.S. 336 (1931); New York v. New Jersey, 256 U.S. 296 (1921).
71. See infra Section IV.C for further discussion of these decisions.
72. See New York v. New Jersey, 256 U.S. at 313 (“We cannot withhold the sugges-
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state compacts as a means of resolving transboundary pollution
controversies.73 Perhaps for this reason, the Court did not exer-
cise original jurisdiction over any transboundary pollution cases
during the middle three decades of the century.
With the advent of Earth Day in 1970 and the associated
surge in public concern about environmental matters, renewed
efforts were made to enlist the Supreme Court in resolving inter-
state pollution disputes. Ohio filed an original complaint in 1970
seeking abatement of mercury contamination of Lake Erie stem-
ming from sources in Michigan and Canada;74 Illinois filed suit in
1971 challenging sewage overflows into Lake Michigan from Mil-
waukee, Wisconsin.75 Concerned about its competence to hear
such suits and anxious to conserve its docket for other purposes,76
the Court refused to exercise its original jurisdiction over these or
other transboundary pollution disputes. Over the next two decades,
the Court endorsed four different conceptions about how such
controversies should be resolved, the only common theme being
that further original suits in the Supreme Court were not accept-
able. Specifically, the Court successively held: 1) that trans-
boundary pollution is governed by the state common law articulat-
ed by the courts of the affected state;77 2) that it is governed by
federal common law to be applied by federal district courts;78
3) that the federal common law has been superseded by federal
statutes to be applied by the EPA;79 and 4) to the extent not
preempted by federal statutes, that transboundary pollution is gov-
erned by the state common law and statutory law of the source
state.80
tion . . . that the grave problem of sewage disposal . . . is one more likely to be wisely
solved by cooperative study and by conference and mutual concession on the part of . . .
the States so vitally interested in it than by proceedings in any court however constitut-
ed.”); West Virginia ex rel. Dyer v. Sims, 341 U.S. 22, 27 (1951) (quoting same lan-
guage).
73. See infra text accompanying notes 173–76.
74. See Ohio v. Wyandotte Chems. Corp., 401 U.S. 493 (1971) (declining to exercise
jurisdiction).
75. See Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 101 (1972) (finding that the feder-
al district court had jurisdiction).
76. See Illinois, 406 U.S. at 93–94; Wyandotte, 401 U.S. at 497–99.
77. See Wyandotte, 401 U.S. at 505.
78. See Illinois, 406 U.S. at 98.
79. See City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 312–15 (1981) (holding that no
federal common law remedy for interstate water pollution is available given the compre-
hensive nature of the Clean Water Act).
80. See International Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481, 487–97 (1987) (holding
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There is no indication that the Court envisioned any apprecia-
ble differences in the substantive content of these different sources
of law. But each shift in the Court’s understanding of the applica-
ble law also shifted the task of developing the law governing such
disputes to a different tribunal. The result, not surprisingly, is that
no single adjudicative system has given the kind of sustained atten-
tion to the problem that is probably necessary if a coherent body
of decisional law is to emerge. The principles tentatively sketched
out in Missouri v. Illinois and Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co.
have therefore been cut off from further development. Trans-
boundary pollution in the United States is today regulated almost
exclusively by federal statutory law.81
2. The Trail Smelter Arbitration. Although frozen in time in
the United States, the Supreme Court’s original cases nevertheless
live on as important precedents in international law. By far the
most influential decision on transboundary pollution in interna-
tional law is the Trail Smelter arbitration.82 From the perspective
of someone versed in U.S. law, the published views of a panel of
three arbitrators chosen by the parties seems like a poor excuse
for a leading precedent. Nevertheless, the Trail Smelter arbitration
has assumed immense importance in the development of the
customary international law on transboundary pollution, primarily
because it is the only adjudicative decision of an international tri-
bunal that speaks directly to the substantive law of transboundary
pollution.83
The arbitration arose out of a controversy between the United
States and Canada over sulphur fumes emitted by a smelter at
Trail, British Columbia, which were blown by prevailing winds
down the Columbia River valley into the northern part of the
State of Washington. The dispute was initially submitted to the
that the Clean Water Act pre-empts the common law of a state if that common law
attempts to make a source in another state liable for the transboundary pollution).
81. Missouri v. Illinois and Tennessee Copper are still occasionally cited, but only
insofar as they establish part of the background understanding for interpreting these stat-
utes. See, e.g., Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 503 U.S. 91, 98, 114 n.19 (1992) (describing the
controversies in Missouri v. Illinois and Tennessee Copper as part of the history of Su-
preme Court adjudication of interstate water disputes).
82. Trail Smelter (U.S. v. Can.), 3 R.I.A.A. 1905, 1938 (1949).
83. See ALEXANDRE KISS & DINAH SHELTON, INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL
LAW 125, 361 (1991).
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International Joint Commission (IJC) established by the Boundary
Waters Treaty of 1909 between the United States and Canada.84
The IJC (which has no binding powers of adjudication85) recom-
mended that Canada pay $350,000 in indemnification to the U.S.
for damages incurred through 1931.86 The two countries even-
tually agreed to this recommendation, and also entered into a
Convention establishing a special arbitration tribunal to determine
“[w]hether damage . . . has occurred since the first day of January,
1932, and, if so, what indemnity should be paid therefor?”87 If
the preliminary answer to this question was yes, the tribunal was
also to decide “whether the Trail Smelter should be required to
refrain from causing damage in the State of Washington in the fu-
ture and, if so, to what extent?”88
Implicit in Canada’s agreement to pay $350,000 in indemnifi-
cation for past damages, and in the phrasing of the questions to
the tribunal by the Convention, was the understanding that the
parties had agreed that Canada was responsible for any damages
that could be proven.89 In other words, the tribunal was not
charged with determining any question of liability, only with fixing
the proper remedy. After taking extensive evidence, the tribunal
rendered a preliminary decision in 1938 finding Canada liable to
the United States for a mere $78,000 in damages from 1932 to
1937.90 Further evidence was taken, and the tribunal rendered a
second decision in 1941 on the question of what prospective relief
was appropriate.91
The 1941 decision approached the question of continuing relief
as a question of law to be decided by ascertaining the nature of
the legal duty that a source state owes to the affected state.92 By
framing the question this way, the tribunal in effect conflated the
standard for awarding permanent relief with the standard for es-
84. Treaty Between the United States and Great Britain Relating to Boundary Wa-
ters Between the United States and Canada, Jan. 11, 1909, U.S.-Can., 36 Stat. 2448.
85. See Maxwell Cohen, The Régime of Boundary Waters—The Canadian-United
States Experience, 146 RECUEIL DES COURS 219, 258 (1975).
86. See Trail Smelter, 3 R.I.A.A. at 1907.
87. Id. at 1908 (quoting the Convention for Settlement of Difficulties Arising from
Operation of Smelter at Trail, B.C.).
88. Id.
89. See Rubin, supra note 22, at 263–64.
90. See Trail Smelter, 3 R.I.A.A. at 1933.
91. See id. at 1974, 1980.
92. See id. at 1963–64.
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tablishing liability. This conflation had fateful consequences, for it
allowed the tribunal to render a decision which had at least the
appearance of an authoritative pronouncement on the content of
the customary international law of transboundary pollution. Per-
haps equally important, this approach launched the panel on a
quest for the content of the international law “rule,” assumed to
be a general principle applicable to all transboundary pollution in
all times and places.
The panel acknowledged that no decision of any international
tribunal could be found dealing with transboundary air or water
pollution.93 The closest authorities on point were the original de-
cisions of the U.S. Supreme Court—which the tribunal was obliged
to follow in any event, since the Convention had specified that it
was to apply U.S. law.94 Nevertheless, the tribunal independently
went out of its way to endorse these decisions as authoritative
precedents in international law.95
The tribunal then proceeded to review the Supreme Court’s
transboundary pollution decisions, including Missouri v. Illinois and
the “leading decision[]” in “the matter of air pollution itself,”
Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co. After providing a lengthy quota-
tion from Tennessee Copper, it offered the following oft-quoted
summation of the law:
The Tribunal, therefore, finds that the above decisions, taken as
a whole, constitute an adequate basis for its conclusions, namely,
that, under the principles of international law, as well as the law
of the United States, no State has the right to use or permit the
use of its territory in such a manner as to cause injury by fumes
in or to the territory of another or the properties or persons
therein, when the case is of serious consequence and the injury is
established by clear and convincing evidence.96
The tribunal further concluded that Canada was responsible under
international law for the Trail Smelter’s pollution:
93. See id. at 1963.
94. See id. at 1908 (quoting Convention) (“The Tribunal shall apply the law and
practice followed in dealing with cognate questions in the United States of America as
well as international law and practice . . . .”).
95. See id. at 1964. The panel added the qualification that the U.S. decisions were
authoritative provided “no contrary rule prevails in international law and no reason for
rejecting such precedents can be adduced from the limitations of sovereignty inherent in
the Constitution of the United States.” Id. No such special limitations were identified.
96. Id. at 1965.
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[T]he Tribunal holds that the Dominion of Canada is responsible
in international law for the conduct of the Trail Smelter. Apart
from the undertakings in the Convention, it is, therefore, the
duty of the Government of the Dominion of Canada to see to it
that this conduct should be in conformity with the obligation of
the Dominion under international law as herein determined.97
The Trail Smelter panel’s restatement of U.S. and international
law supports each of the three consensus elements of today’s cus-
tomary international law of transboundary pollution. First, the
panel squarely held that “Canada is responsible in international
law for the conduct of the Trail Smelter.”98 A source state thus
may not “permit the use of its territory” for injurious trans-
boundary pollution.99 Second, in accordance with the tribunal’s
reading of the Supreme Court opinions, liability will attach only
when “the case is of serious consequence and the injury is estab-
lished by clear and convincing evidence.”100 Third, the panel im-
plied that liability is strict, provided the requisite causation is
shown: “no State has the right . . . to cause injury by fumes in or
to the territory of another or the properties or persons there-
in.”101
International law publicists are divided about the authority of
Trail Smelter as a source of international customary law. Some find
that the decision, especially when supplemented by other less
clearly applicable precedents such as the Lake Lanoux arbitra-
tion102 and the Corfu Channel case,103 directly supports the con-
clusion that source states are strictly liable for pollution that di-
rectly causes significant injury in another state.104 Others believe
97. Id. at 1965–66.
98. Id. at 1965.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Affaire du Lac Lanoux (Spain v. Fr.), 12 R.I.A.A. 281, 314–317 (Trib. Arb. 1957)
(apportioning water in river flowing from France into Spain and cautioning against chang-
es in water quality that might cause injury to Spanish interests).
103. Corfu Channel Case (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4, 15–23 (holding Albania legally
responsible for damage to British warships from mines placed in Albanian waters presum-
ably with Albania’s knowledge).
104. See, e.g., SPRINGER, supra note 4, at 133–134; L.F.E. Goldie, International Prin-
ciples of Responsibility for Pollution, 9 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 282, 306–07 (1970);
Gunther Handl, Paying the Piper for Transboundary Nuclear Damage: State Liability in a
System of Transnational Compensation, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLLUTION, supra
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that the issue of liability was not directly before the arbitration
panel, and therefore that its statement on this point was dic-
tum.105 This division among publicists, however, is confined large-
ly to the question of the authoritativeness of the Trail Smelter
decision.106 Whether the tribunal was correct in its assumption
that the “true” customary international rule takes the form of a
universal principle, and whether the content of that principle en-
tails some form of strict liability, has engendered relatively little
dissent.107
3. Modern Declarations of “Soft” International Law. Author-
itative or not, the Trail Smelter decision has been extremely
influential in the formulation of numerous official and semi-official
international charters, declarations, and statements of principle
dealing with transboundary pollution. Although these materials are
not directly binding on nation-states, they are nevertheless
regarded as important indicia of the requirements of customary
international law. By and large, this “soft” international law108
note 7, at 150, 162; see also Constance O’Keefe, Transboundary Pollution and the Strict
Liability Issue: The Work of the International Law Commission on the Topic of Interna-
tional Liability for Injurious Consequences Arising Out of Acts Not Prohibited by Interna-
tional Law, 18 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 145, 174–76 (1990) (discussing impact of
case).
105. See, e.g., Rubin, supra note 22, at 264 (“[T]he liability of Canada for ‘damage’
[was] assumed.”); Joni S. Charme, Transnational Injury and Ultra-Hazardous Activity: an
Emerging Norm of International Strict Liability, 4 J.L. & TECH. 75, 86 (1989) (“[C]lose
examination reveals a failure on the part of the tribunal to . . . address . . . liability,
precisely because the suit was characterized as one implicating the law of nuisance.”);
Edith Brown Weiss, Who Pays for Weather Modification Damage? 4 ENV. POL’Y & L.
22, 23 (1978) (“[L]iability was not an issue.”).
106. For what it is worth, I believe that those who argue for the authoritativeness of
the Trail Smelter arbitration are correct. It is true that the only issue before the tribunal
was the proper remedy for Canada’s pollution. But given the panel’s premise that a
permanent injunction would be appropriate only if Canada was subject to a duty under
international law not to engage in such pollution, see supra text accompanying notes
89–101, the panel’s determination of whether there was such a duty was necessary to its
decision and hence was not dictum.
107. But see BIRNIE & BOYLE, supra note 23, at 142–47 (arguing that actual state
practice, as opposed to soft law declarations, supports a general due diligence require-
ment only). More commonly, publicists object to the Trail Smelter formulation on the
ground that it failed to adopt a standard of strict liability that is strict enough to handle
modern environmental problems. The limitation to “serious” injury proven by clear and
convincing evidence has been the special focus of attack. See, e.g., Rubin, supra note 22,
at 276–78 (criticizing Trail Smelter for allowing money damages only if it is shown that
emissions do tangible injury).
108. On the widespread use of “soft” law in shaping international environmental
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carries forward the Trail Smelter tribunal’s basic strategy: these
sources seek to articulate a statement of universal principle
governing all transboundary pollution; they focus on the issue of
causation of a given quantum of harm in another state; and they
imply, but do not explicitly state, a standard of strict liability for
all transboundary pollution above the harm threshold.
A number of authoritative pronouncements embody this ap-
proach.109 Without a doubt the most famous is the Stockholm
Declaration of 1972, which provides in its Principle 21 that states
have “the responsibility to ensure that activities within their juris-
diction or control do not cause damage to the environment of
other States or of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdic-
tion.”110 This language is widely viewed as reflecting the prece-
dent established by the Trail Smelter arbitration.111 Although it
norms, see Peter H. Sand, Lessons Learned in Global Environmental Governance, 18 B.C.
ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 213, 239–40 (1991) (arguing that while “soft” laws can take instant
effect because they are not subject to national ratification, their lack of formality makes
them inherently vulnerable to public attack).
109. See, e.g., Final Report of the Experts Group on Environmental Law on Legal
Principles for Environmental Protection and Sustainable Development, art. 10, in EXPERT
GROUP ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW OF THE WORLD COMMISSION ON ENVIRONMENT AND
DEVELOPMENT, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 75
(1987) (endorsing the principle that “States shall . . . prevent or abate any transboundary
environmental interference or a significant risk thereof which causes substantial harm—i.e.
harm which is not minor or insignificant”); Rules on International Law Applicable to
Transfrontier Pollution, art. 3, Sept. 4, 1982, 60 I.L.A. 158, 160 (1982) (arguing that states
are “under an obligation to prevent, abate and control transfrontier pollution to such an
extent that no substantial injury is caused in the territory of another State”); Stockholm
Declaration of the United Nations, June 16, 1972, Conference on the Human Environ-
ment, 11 I.L.M. 1416 (1972) [hereinafter Stockholm Declaration]; Helsinki Rules on the
Uses of the Waters of International Rivers, art. 10, Aug. 20, 1966, 52 I.L.A. 484, 496–97
(1966) (providing that every state located on an international drainage basin “must pre-
vent any new form of water pollution or any increase in the degree of existing water
pollution in an international drainage basin which would cause substantial injury in the
territory of a co-basin State”); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS
LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 601(1) (1987) (concluding that a state “is obligated to
take such measures as may be necessary, to the extent practicable under the circumstanc-
es, to ensure that activities within its jurisdiction or control . . . are conducted so as not
to cause significant injury to the environment of another state or of areas beyond the
limits of national jurisdiction”).
110. Stockholm Declaration, supra note 109, at 1420; see also Louis B. Sohn, The
Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environment, 14 HARV. INT’L L.J. 423, 492–93
(1974) (discussing background of Principle 21 and stressing the importance of the second
part, which limits states’ rights to exploit natural resources to those uses which do not
damage others).
111. See AMERICAN SOC’Y OF INT’L L., PROCEEDINGS OF THE 77TH ANNUAL MEET-
ING 433–35 (1985).
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does not expressly use the words “strict liability” or their equiva-
lent, it is widely regarded as endorsing the principle of state re-
sponsibility for all activities that cause the requisite “damage to
the environment” beyond their territory.112 Principle 21, in turn,
has been reaffirmed in numerous other charters and declara-
tions,113 including the 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and
Development.114
In summing up the customary international law of trans-
boundary pollution, contemporary publicists frequently say that it
adopts the maxim sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas.115 To be
sure, neither the Trail Smelter decision nor the Supreme Court’s
original jurisdiction decisions use this phrase. Further, the maxim
has largely disappeared from the common law of nuisance, because
it is widely recognized to be question-begging.116 Nevertheless,
the sic utere formula evidently has considerable utility for inter-
national law publicists, because it suggests a norm of strict liability
without expressly saying so. Indeed, this approach seems to cap-
ture the dominant strategy of the international environmental law
community: pushing for de facto endorsements of the principle of
strict liability for transboundary pollution under a cloak of ambi-
guity, in the hope of building a consensus for staunch environmen-
tal obligations while minimizing the risk that states will rebel
against the implications of those obligations.117
Occasionally one encounters a departure from the general
strategy of promoting a universal norm of strict liability for
significant transboundary pollution. Of particular note is the
112. See BIRNIE & BOYLE, supra note 23, at 92–98; Pierre-Marie Dupuy, Overview of
the Existing Customary Legal Regime Regarding International Pollution, in INTERNATION-
AL LAW AND POLLUTION, supra note 7, at 61, 63–64.
113. See COVEY T. OLIVER ET AL., THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM 442–443
(1995) (listing reaffirmations).
114. See Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.
151/26 (1992), reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 874, 876 (1992) (Principle 2).
115. See, e.g., Note, Developments in the Law—International Environmental Law, 104
HARV. L. REV. 1484, 1496–97 (1991); O’Keefe, supra note 104, at 162–63, 175–76. The
maxim is translated as “one should use his own property in such a manner as not to
injure that of another.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1380 (6th ed. 1990).
116. See Hale v. Farmers Elec. Membership Corp., 99 P.2d 454, 456 (N.M. 1940)
(holding that sic utere is a good moral precept, but useless as a legal maxim, since it
determines no right and defines no obligation).
117. For an enlightening account of the convoluted deliberations of the International
Law Commission in seeking a formula for state liability that does not use the “dreaded”
phrase “strict liability,” see O’Keefe, supra note 104, at 178–85.
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OECD Council Recommendations on Principles Concerning
Transfrontier Pollution, adopted in 1974.118 After tipping its hat
in the direction of the Stockholm Declaration,119 the Council
urged that transboundary pollution disputes be resolved on the
basis of what it called a “principle of non-discrimination.”120 Un-
der this principle, the source states should agree to control
transboundary pollution to levels considered acceptable in compa-
rable circumstances in the source state itself, and should agree to
afford the same rights in judicial and administrative proceedings to
persons in an affected state as to persons in the source state.121
The OECD Principles thus reflect a very different strategy for
dealing with transboundary pollution—one that eschews a universal
standard of conduct in favor of norms embedded in the practices
of the affected parties, and designed to promote a spirit of reci-
procity rather than an abstract environmental ideal. The alternative
approach reflected in the OECD Principles, however, has been
largely drowned out in the chorus of approval for the strict liabili-
ty approach of the Trail Smelter arbitration and the Stockholm
Declaration.122
4. United States Statutory Law. Within the federal system of
the United States, comprehensive environmental statutes have
superseded common law liability. Nevertheless, the principal
statutes dealing with transboundary pollution—the Clean Air Act
and the Clean Water Act—embody the same understanding
reflected in customary international law: source states should be
118. See Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, Council Recom-
mendation on Principles Concerning Transfrontier Pollution, Nov. 14, 1974, 14 I.L.M. 242
(1975) [hereinafter OECD Recommendation].
119. See id. at 243.
120. See id. at 244–45.
121. See id.
122. Besides the OECD Council, two other sources in the 1970s also endorsed equal
access provisions, a type of reciprocity principle. See United Nations Environment Pro-
gram: Draft Principles of Conduct in the Field of the Environment for Guidance of
States in the Conservation and Harmonious Utilization of Natural Resources Shared by
Two or More States, Principle 14, May 19, 1978, 17 I.L.M. 1097, 1099 (1978); Joel A.
Gallob, Birth of the North American Transboundary Environmental Plaintiff:
Transboundary Pollution and the 1979 Draft Treaty for Equal Access and Remedy, 15
HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 85 (1991) (discussing Joint Working Group on the Settlement of
International Disputes, Draft Treaty on a Regime of Equal Access and Remedy in Cases
of Transfrontier Pollution (1979)).
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held strictly liable for interstate pollution that causes significant
harm in an affected state.
The Clean Air Act requires each state to adopt an implemen-
tation plan designed to achieve certain air quality standards. Ac-
cording to section 110(a)(2)(D), each implementation plan must
prohibit “any source or other type of emissions activity within the
State from emitting any air pollutant in amounts which will . . .
contribute significantly to nonattainment in, or interfere with main-
tenance by, any other State with respect to” air quality stan-
dards.123 This requirement is a fairly precise restatement of the
three consensus elements reflected in international customary law:
the source state is made legally responsible for emissions activity
within its jurisdiction that has an extraterritorial effect; the source
state will be held liable if emissions “contribute significantly” to
noncompliance with air quality standards in any other state; once
this threshold is reached, the legal liability of the source state is
strict—it must prohibit “any” source from emitting “any” pollutant
that interferes with compliance in “any other” state. Section
110(a)(2)(D)’s statement of the applicable legal standard is rein-
forced by a procedural mechanism set forth in section 126. This
section authorizes “[a]ny State or political subdivision” to petition
the EPA for “a finding that any major source or group of station-
ary sources [in another state] emits or would emit any air pollut-
ant” in violation of the substantive standard of section
110(a)(2)(D).124 If such a finding is rendered, new sources that
123. 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(2)(D)(i) (1994).
124. 42 U.S.C. § 7426(b). Actually, after the 1990 amendments to the Clean Air Act,
section 126(b) contains what appears to be a typographical error which, if read literally,
would render the EPA’s obligation to make such a finding meaningless. As now written,
section 126(b) permits affected states to petition the EPA for a finding that a source
state is “in violation of the prohibition of section 7410(a)(2)(D)(ii) of this title . . . . ”
Section 7410(a)(2)(D)(ii), in turn, states that every state implementation plan must insure
“compliance with the applicable requirements of [section 126].” Together, the two provi-
sions simply refer to each other, and neither sets forth a substantive obligation. The
substantive obligation to protect downwind states is contained in section 7410(a)(2)(D)(i),
which is not referred to in section 126(b). Prior to the 1990 amendments, section 126(b)
correctly cross-referenced to subparagraph (i), not (ii). See 42 U.S.C. § 7426(b) (1988).
Presumably, the EPA and the courts will disregard the typographical error, either on the
ground that when read in context the “true meaning” of “section 7410(a)(2)(D)(ii)” is
“section 7410(a)(2)(D)(i),” see National Bank of Oregon v. Insurance Agents, 508 U.S.
439, 462 (1993) (holding that courts should “‘disregard the punctuation, or repunctuate, if
need be, to render the true meaning of the statute’” when there is “overwhelming evi-
dence” from the structure, language, and subject matter of an act that the punctuation in
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would violate the standard may not be constructed or operated
and existing sources must reduce their emissions to permit the
affected state to come into compliance with the standard “as expe-
ditiously as practicable, but in no case later than three years after
the date of such finding.”125
The Clean Air Act also provides a mechanism for addressing
international transboundary pollution, under a type of strict liabili-
ty. The mechanism, set forth in section 115, is based on interna-
tional reciprocity: it applies to any foreign country that provides
“essentially the same rights” to the United States.126 When the
Administrator of the EPA receives a report from a “duly consti-
tuted international agency” that emissions of air pollution from the
United States “may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public
health or welfare in” a reciprocating foreign country, the Adminis-
trator “shall” notify the governor of the state in which such emis-
sions originate of the need to revise the applicable state implemen-
tation plan so as to “prevent or eliminate the endangerment.”127
The Clean Water Act, at least as interpreted by the EPA,
also establishes what is in effect a rule of strict liability for signifi-
cant transboundary pollution. While the text of the Act itself sends
a rather garbled message about transboundary pollution,128 since
question is a typographical error (citation omitted)); or on the ground that the plain
meaning leads to an absurd result, see Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504,
509–10 (1989) (rejecting a literal interpretation of FED. R. EVID. 609(a) because it
“would compel an odd result”).
125. 42 U.S.C. § 7426(c). The 1990 amendments to the Clean Air Act seek to beef
up the enforcement of the interstate pollution limitations by providing for the creation of
a number of interstate transport commissions. See 42 U.S.C. § 7506a(b) (providing for
interstate transport commissions to make recommendations to the EPA about measures
to achieve compliance with section 7410(a)(2)(D)); 42 U.S.C. § 7511c (creating special
interstate air commission for ozone comprising states in northeastern United States); 42
U.S.C. § 7492(c) (providing for interstate transport commissions to address degradation of
visibility in pristine areas). It remains to be seen whether these commissions will have a
significant impact on the control of interstate air pollution under the Act. In 1995, the
EPA, acting on the recommendation of the Northeast Ozone Transport Commission es-
tablished pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 7511c, ordered twelve states in the Northeast and the
District of Columbia to adopt the stricter “California” auto emissions standards in order
to reduce transboundary ground level ozone in the region. The D.C. Circuit recently
invalidated this order as exceeding the EPA’s statutory authority. See Virginia v. EPA,
44 Env’t Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1129 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 11, 1997).
126. 42 U.S.C. § 7415(c).
127. 42 U.S.C. § 7415(a), (b).
128. The Act requires that point sources of water pollution obtain permits establishing
effluent limitations, and also requires the states to establish water quality standards for
different bodies of water pursuant to EPA regulatory guidelines. See 33 U.S.C. § 1311
FILE:C:\WP51\DLJ\MERRILL.PP Dec 12/06/97 Sat 10:53am
1997] TRANSBOUNDARY POLLUTION 957
1973 the EPA has interpreted the Act to mean that a permit may
not be issued to a point source of pollution in a source state
“[w]hen the imposition of conditions cannot ensure compliance
with the applicable water quality requirements of all affected
States.”129 In Arkansas v. Oklahoma,130 the Supreme Court up-
held this regulation as a permissible agency interpretation of the
statute under the Chevron doctrine.131 The Court also upheld the
EPA’s understanding that not every migration of pollutants from
the source state to the affected state is prohibited by this rule,
only those that lead to a “detectable violation” of the affected
state’s water quality standards.132 The resulting regime is very
close to a rule of strict liability for all significant or substantial
transboundary pollution.
B. Transboundary Pollution—Legal Reality
When we look beneath the surface of the foregoing interna-
tional declarations and domestic statutes, the “law in action” with
respect to transboundary pollution reflects something considerably
(effluent limitations); id. § 1313 (water quality standards). The effluent limitations are in-
tended, among other things, to assure compliance with the water quality standards. See
id. § 1311. Section 402 of the Act establishes the permitting system, called the National
Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES). See id. § 1342(a). Such permits may be
issued either by the EPA or by a state agency that meets certain federal requirements.
See id. § 1342(a), (b). With respect to possible transboundary pollution effects, section
402 merely requires that potentially affected states receive notice and an opportunity to
submit written recommendations before a permit is issued in a source state. See 33
U.S.C. § 1342(b)(5); see also City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 325–26 (1981)
(describing section 402(b)(5) as reflecting only a requirement of notice and an opportu-
nity to submit written recommendations). However, section 401 of the Act provides that
before any person may receive a federal license or permit to discharge pollutants, the
EPA must be satisfied that the discharge will not interfere with any other state’s compli-
ance with water quality standards. See id. § 1341(a)(2). It is unclear from the face of the
statute whether Section 401 was intended to apply to federal permits issued under the
NPDES system, and if so, whether the same requirement applies to NPDES permits
issued by the states rather than the federal government. See id. § 1341. In Arkansas v.
Oklahoma, 503 U.S. 91 (1992), the Supreme Court held that the EPA could interpret
section 401 as applying to federal NPDES permits; it expressly declined to reach the
question whether section 401 applies to state NPDES permits. See id. at 104, 107.
129. 40 C.F.R. § 122.4(d) (1996).
130. 503 U.S. 91 (1992).
131. See id. at 107; see also Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843–44 (1984) (holding that unless an administrative agency’s
construction of a statutory scheme is “arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the
statute,” a court should give controlling weight to the interpretation).
132. Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 503 U.S. at 109–11.
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less impressive than suggested by the official accounts. As one
author has observed, “To say that a state has no right to injure
the environment of another seems quixotic in the face of the great
variety of transborder environmental harms that occur every
day.”133
1. Adjudications. The most glaring evidence of the disparity
between legal doctrine and legal reality is the dearth of individual
adjudications enforcing any standard of liability for transboundary
pollution, strict or otherwise. In international law, the Trail Smelter
arbitration, which was established by a bilateral convention
between Canada and the United States, stands virtually alone.134
The most prominent attempt since Trail Smelter to adjudicate a
transboundary pollution dispute under international law occurred
in 1973, when New Zealand and Australia filed complaints with
the International Court of Justice (ICJ) asking it to declare that
French nuclear-weapons testing in the Pacific unlawfully threatened
downwind populations with radioactive fallout.135 France refused
to appear in response to the complaint. When the ICJ proceeded
to grant certain interim relief,136 France ignored the order. Later,
when France indicated that it had completed its atmospheric
testing program for the time being, the ICJ beat a strategic retreat
and declared the controversy moot.137
Since then, there have been several highly publicized episodes
of serious transboundary pollution, but none has resulted in an
international adjudication of state liability. Although the explosion
and fire at the Chernobyl nuclear reactor in 1985 caused signifi-
133. Oscar Schachter, The Emergence of International Environmental Law, 44 J. INT’L
AFF. 457, 463 (1991). See also Daniel Bodansky, Customary (and not so Customary)
International Environmental Law, 3 IND. J. GLOBAL L. STUD. 105, 110–11 (1995).
134. See generally Bodansky, supra note 133, at 114 (Trail Smelter “[s]till the only
case in which a state was held internationally responsible for causing transboundary
harm.”); Note, supra note 115, at 1496–1501 (noting the scarcity of noteworthy decisions,
their limited precedential value, and the resultant stifling of doctrinal development); Ru-
bin, supra note 22, at 259 (observing that Trail Smelter is the only precedent cited in
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES on a
state’s liability to another in connection with pollution).
135. See Nuclear Tests, (N.Z. v. Fr.), 1974 I.C.J. 457 (Dec. 20); Nuclear Tests (Austl.
v. Fr.), 1974 I.C.J. 253 (Dec. 20); see generally Jerome B. Elkind, French Nuclear Testing
and Article 41—Another Blow to the Authority of the Court?, 8 VAND J. TRANSNAT’L L.
39–45 (1974) (describing background of the controversy).
136. See Nuclear Tests (Austl. v. Fr.), 1973 I.C.J. 99, 135.
137. See Nuclear Tests (Austl. v. Fr.), 1974 I.C.J. 253, 272.
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cant increases in radioactivity levels in more than twenty down-
wind states and resulted in losses of million of dollars in con-
demned agricultural products, no state brought suit against the
Soviet Union seeking compensation.138 The next year, a major
chemical spill into the Rhine River by the Sandoz Chemical Com-
pany in Switzerland caused extensive damage to the river and its
resources in downstream states.139 But again, no downstream
state sought any remedy under international law against Switzer-
land for these damages.140 As one commentator ruefully observed
after reviewing this record, “[p]ublicists’ efforts at codifying stan-
dards of conduct notwithstanding, international liability remains an
empty abstraction.”141
Attempts to secure relief under U.S. law have fared little
better. Although the Clean Air Act forbids any pollution that will
“contribute significantly” to an affected state’s nonattainment of
air quality standards,142 no state has ever succeeded in obtaining
relief under section 126 for pollution emanating in another
state.143 The courts have upheld the EPA’s steadfast refusal to
act against interstate air pollution, sometimes affirming the EPA’s
discretion to adopt narrow interpretations of its statutory obliga-
tions,144 and in other cases deferring to the EPA’s technical ex-
pertise in finding inadequate proof of an interstate effect.145
The international transboundary pollution provision of section
115 of the Clean Air Act has also proven to be a dead letter. For
example, Canada has complained for years about acid rain which
it contends is predominantly caused by transboundary pollution
138. See PHILIPPE SANDS, CHERNOBYL: LAW AND COMMUNICATION 1–2, 27 (1988);
Ellen B. Moynagh, Comment, The Legacy of Chernobyl: Its Significance for the Ukraine
and the World, 21 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 709, 712–22 (1994).
139. See Aaron Schwabach, Comment, The Sandoz Spill: The Failure of International
Law to Protect the Rhine from Pollution, 16 ECOLOGY L.Q. 443, 445–48 (1989).
140. See Note, supra note 115, at 1500.
141. Id. at 1499–1500.
142. See 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(2)(D) (1994).
143. See New York v. United States, 852 F.2d 574, 581 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (R.B.
Ginsburg, J., concurring); Revesz, supra note 4, at 2362–74; Kay M. Crider, Note, Inter-
state Air Pollution: Over a Decade of Ineffective Regulation, 64 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 619,
633 (1988).
144. See New York, 852 F.2d 574; Connecticut v. United States EPA, 656 F.2d 902
(2d Cir. 1981).
145. See Air Pollution Control Dist. v. EPA, 739 F.2d 1071, 1093 (6th Cir. 1984);
New York v. United States EPA, 716 F.2d 440, 444 (7th Cir. 1983); New York v. United
States EPA, 710 F.2d 1200, 1204 (6th Cir. 1983).
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emanating from the United States.146 In early 1981, it looked as
though Canada might obtain relief. The IJC, concededly a “duly
constituted international agency,” found that pollutants emitted in
the United States were causing acid rain in Canada.147 Douglas
Costle, Administrator of the EPA in the outgoing Carter Adminis-
tration, responded by issuing a letter pursuant to section 115 con-
cluding that acid rain from United States sources was endangering
health and welfare in Canada.148 However, Administrator Costle’s
successors, who were appointed by President Reagan, did not
believe that this letter bound them to take any further action.
Their inaction was sustained by the D.C. Circuit, which ruled that
the Costle letter was procedurally defective.149 Canada subse-
quently filed a formal petition requesting the institution of a
rulemaking proceeding to implement the findings in Costle’s letter.
The EPA rejected the petition, on the ground that the Clean Air
Act did not require that any action be taken until the precise
sources of the pollution in the United States could be identi-
fied.150 The D.C. Circuit then upheld this narrow interpretation
of the Act as a permissible exercise of agency discretion.151
The consistent losing streak of plaintiff states and nation-states
under the Clean Air Act suggests that even express statutory caus-
es of action for transboundary pollution are of limited utility. If
the executive branch is unenthusiastic about granting relief to an
affected state complaining about transboundary pollution, it ap-
pears that the courts are unlikely to intercede and force the
executive’s hands.
The EPA’s Clean Water Act regulation, which forbids point
sources from emitting discharges that result in a violation of water
quality standards in another state,152 has also resulted in very lit-
tle reported administrative or judicial action.153 In Arkansas v.
146. See JOHN E. CARROLL, ENVIRONMENTAL DIPLOMACY: AN EXAMINATION AND A
PROSPECTIVE OF CANADIAN-U.S. TRANSBOUNDARY ENVIRONMENTAL RELATIONS 239–74
(1983).
147. See The Queen ex rel. Ontario v. United States EPA, 912 F.2d 1525, 1529 (D.C.
Cir. 1990); Thomas v. New York, 802 F.2d 1443, 1445 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
148. See The Queen ex rel. Ontario v. United States EPA, 912 F.2d at 1529.
149. See Thomas, 802 F.2d at 1446. (“[W]hatever the impact of Administrator Costle’s
letter, it cannot serve as a basis for judicial relief.”)
150. See The Queen ex rel. Ontario v. United States EPA, 912 F.2d at 1533–34.
151. See id. at 1534.
152. 40 C.F.R. § 122.44(d)(4) (1996); see also supra note 128.
153. See, e.g., infra note 231.
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Oklahoma,154 the Supreme Court upheld the EPA’s factual find-
ing that discharges from a new sewage treatment plant in Arkan-
sas, located thirty-nine miles upstream from the Oklahoma state
line, would not result in a detectable violation of water quality
standards in Oklahoma.155 Oklahoma’s failure to secure relief for
transboundary water pollution was not unique. There are very few
reported decisions in which the EPA has granted relief to a down-
stream state whose water quality standards have been jeopardized
by an upstream source.156
2. Treaties and Compacts. When we turn from adjudications
of transboundary pollution disputes to bilateral and multilateral
treaties and compacts dealing with transboundary pollution, the
record is somewhat more encouraging. A handful of treaties and
interstate compacts adopt meaningful regulation of transboundary
pollution. The successful treaties and compacts do not, however,
adopt any kind of centralized, universal adjudicatory mechanism
based on strict liability (or any other standard of care). Rather,
they incorporate specific limitations on discharges of pollutants.
Moreover, the small number of success stories are far out-
numbered by the failures to achieve any kind of effective regime
for collective control of transboundary pollution.
a. Agreements establishing liability regimes. In contrast to the
ringing denunciations of transboundary pollution that are found in
United Nations declarations and other “soft” law, very few legally
binding treaties incorporate the strict liability conception of the
Trail Smelter panel.157 The most prominent liability treaties that
154. 503 U.S. 91 (1992).
155. See id. at 111–12.
156. But see Champion Int’l Corp. v. EPA, 648 F. Supp. 1390 (W.D.N.C. 1986) (hold-
ing that the EPA may take over permitting authority from North Carolina in part be-
cause the state failed to modify proposed permit to assure compliance with Tennessee
water quality standards), rev’d, vacated and remanded, 850 F.2d 182 (4th Cir. 1988) (hold-
ing that although “EPA has acted properly,” the case should be dismissed for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction); cf. City of Albuquerque v. Browner, 865 F.Supp. 733, 741–42
(D.N.M. 1993) (questioning whether water quality standards approved for a downstream
state would result in unfeasible discharge limits for an upstream state, but noting that the
issue was not before the court).
157. See JAN SCHNEIDER, WORLD PUBLIC ORDER OF THE ENVIRONMENT: TOWARDS
AN INTERNATIONAL ECOLOGICAL LAW AND ORGANIZATION 168–71 (1979) (reviewing
treaties that provide for strict liability); see also L.F.E. Goldie, Development of an Inter-
national Environmental Law—An Appraisal, in LAW, INSTITUTIONS & THE GLOBAL ENVI-
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could apply to transboundary pollution are the Paris and Vienna
Conventions on civil liability for nuclear damage, which impose
“absolute” liability for injuries caused by releases from nuclear
reactors, subject to narrow defenses.158 The former is a regional
treaty that applies only in Europe; the latter is global but has
been ratified by only fourteen nations. Both treaties have very low
limits on liability,159 and neither has apparently ever been
invoked.
The only other transboundary liability treaty of note is the
1974 Nordic Convention, which incorporates a reciprocity rule
permitting the citizens of each signatory state (Denmark, Finland,
Norway, Sweden) to sue in the courts of any other state for com-
pensation based on transboundary pollution.160 It appears, howev-
er, that this provision also has never been invoked.161 Several
other conventions mention liability, but either in vague terms with
no institutional mechanism for implementation162 or as a promise
to be fleshed out by future protocols which have apparently never
been adopted.163
RONMENT 104, 135–39 (John Lawrence Hargrove ed., 1972); O’Keefe, supra note 104, at
170–74. Several treaties besides those mentioned in the text adopt something akin to
strict liability for “ultrahazardous activities” like nuclear accidents or oil spills, but they
apply to releases into a commons like the oceans or outer space. See Convention on the
Liability of Operators of Nuclear Ships, May 25, 1962, art. II(1), 57 AM. J. INT’L L. 268
(1963) (calling for strict liability for nuclear damage caused by certain ships); Convention
on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects, March 29, 1972, art. II,
961 U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter Space Objects Convention] (calling for strict liability for
damage caused by space objects falling to earth); International Convention on Civil Lia-
bility for Oil Pollution Damage, Nov. 29, 1969, Art. III(1), 973 U.N.T.S. 3 (calling for
strict liability for pollution damage caused by ship’s oil discharge). As noted in Section
II.A, infra, I regard the problem of pollution of a commons as distinct from trans-
boundary pollution; hence I have not included these treaties as examples of trans-
boundary pollution regulation.
158. See Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage, May 21, 1963, art.
IV(1), 2 I.L.M. 727 (1968); Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear
Energy, July 29, 1960, art. 3, 956 U.N.T.S. 251 (1974).
159. See U.N. CONFERENCE ON ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT, THE EFFECTIVE-
NESS OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEMENTS 401–02 (1992).
160. See Convention on the Protection of the Environment, Feb. 19, 1974, 1092
U.N.T.S. 279.
161. See Gallob, supra note 122, at 108–10.
162. See Treaty of the La Plata River and its Maritime Limits, Nov. 19, 1973, Arg.-
Uru., art. 51, 13 I.L.M. 251.
163. See Convention for the Protection of the Natural Resources and Environment of
the South Pacific Region, Nov. 25, 1986, art. 20, 26 I.L.M. 38, 49 (1987).
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b. Agreements establishing specific pollution limitations. Of greater
significance are a number of treaties and compacts that adopt
substantive regulatory limits on specific kinds of transboundary
pollution or in which the parties agree on specific controls to pre-
vent certain types of transboundary pollution. The most important
of these agreements concerns the most pervasive form of
transboundary pollution—acid rain. Acid rain, like transboundary
pollution in general, has been notoriously resistant to effective
regulation, both internationally and within a federal system like
the United States.164 In recent years, however, substantive limit-
ations on emissions of the precursor gases responsible for acid rain
have been achieved in both Europe and the United States.
In Europe, significant collective action against acid rain has
been realized through successive revisions of the Long-Range
Transboundary Air Pollution Convention (LRTAP).165 In the
United States, Congress added a new subtitle to the Clean Air Act
in 1990 after a decade of contentious debate.166 Under both the
LRTAP and the 1990 Clean Air Act regimes, the final regulations
include arbitrary cutbacks in levels of sulfur dioxide emis-
sions—initially a 30% reduction from 1980 baseline levels in Eu-
rope,167 and a reduction of 10 million tons from 1980 baseline
164. See JUTTA BRUNEE, ACID RAIN AND OZONE LAYER DEPLETION: INTERNATION-
AL LAW AND REGULATION 81–141 (1988) (examining international regulatory responses
to acid rain); MARSHALL E. WILCHER, THE POLITICS OF ACID RAIN 11–71 (1989) (dis-
cussing acid rain policies in Canada, Great Britain, and the United States); J. Wallace
Malley, Jr., Acid Rain: A Decade of Footdragging May Be Coming To an End, 91 W.
VA. L. REV. 817 (1989) (characterizing acid rain regulation in the United States as “to-
tally ineffective”).
165. See Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution [hereinafter
LRTAP], Nov. 13, 1979, 1302 U.N.T.S. 217; Protocol to the 1979 Convention on Long-
Range Transboundary Air Pollution Concerning the Control of Emissions of Nitrogen
Oxides or their Transboundary Fluxes, Oct. 31, 1988, 28 I.L.M. 212 (1989); see generally
Marc A. Levy, European Acid Rain: The Power of Tote-Board Diplomacy, in INSTITU-
TIONS FOR THE EARTH: SOURCES OF EFFECTIVE INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL PRO-
TECTION 75 (Peter M. Haas et al. eds., 1993) (discussing creation and goals of LRTAP);
Gregory Wetstone & Armin Rosencranz, Transboundary Air Pollution: The Search for an
International Response, 8 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 89 (1984) (discussing provisions of
LRTAP).
166. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7651–7651(o); Henry A. Waxman, An Overview of the Clean
Air Act Amendments of 1990, 21 ENVTL. L. 1721, 1723–42 (1991).
167. See Johan G. Lammers, The European Approach to Acid Rain, in INTERNATION-
AL LAW AND POLLUTION, supra note 7, at 267. The initial 30% reduction has recently
been increased by additional amounts that vary with the identity of the state. See Proto-
col to the 1979 Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution on Further
Reduction of Sulphur Emissions, annex II, June 14, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1540 (1994).
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emissions levels in the United States.168
The United States and its neighbors to the north and south
have also entered into a small number of bilateral agreements
concerning specific transboundary pollution problems.169 Perhaps
the clearest success story in terms of meaningful action by a
source state involves pollution of the lower Colorado River.170
An ill-conceived reclamation project in Arizona in the early 1960s
caused the salinity of the Colorado drastically to increase, with
devastating affects on crop yields in the Mexicali region of Mexico.
After twelve years of negotiations, the United States agreed to
take measures to restore salinity levels to roughly what they were
before 1961.171 Most North American transboundary pollution
problems, however, have resisted any solution that would require
the source state to take burdensome action beyond what it is
prepared to take in order to abate domestic pollution.172
168. See 42 U.S.C. § 7651(b) (1994).
169. Outside the U.S.-Canada and U.S.-Mexico contexts, such agreements are unusual
but not entirely nonexistent. See, e.g., Convention on the Protection of the Rhine Against
Chemical Pollution, Dec. 3, 1976, 16 I.L.M. 242 (1977) (requiring that signatory countries
adopt a permitting system for discharge of listed pollutants into the Rhine River); Con-
vention on the Protection of the Rhine Against Pollution by Chlorides, Dec. 3, 1976, 16
I.L.M. 265 (1977) (requiring France to take specific measures to reduce discharge of
chloride ions into Rhine, and apportioning expenses among France, Germany, Nether-
lands, and Switzerland).
170. See generally Joseph F. Friedkin, The International Problem with Mexico over the
Salinity of the Lower Colorado River, in WATER AND THE AMERICAN WEST: ESSAYS IN
HONOR OF RAPHAEL J. MOSES 31, 49 (David H. Getches ed., 1988) (recounting history);
David H. Getches, From Askhabad, to Wellton-Mohawk, to Los Angeles: The Drought in
Water Policy, 64 U. COLO. L. REV. 523, 531–34 (1993) (describing efforts to rectify dam-
age done by earlier efforts to increase agricultural productivity in southwest Arizona).
171. The “permanent and definitive solution” to the problem was to be the construc-
tion of a high-tech desalinization plant built on the United States side of the border.
Agreement on Colorado Salinity, Aug. 30, 1973, U.S.-Mex., 24 U.S.T. 1968, 1974–76. The
plant took eighteen years to build, has experienced operational difficulties, and is regard-
ed by United States budget overseers as entailing excessive costs. See Jenifer Warren,
Yuma Desalinization Plant Comes of Age—Too Late, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 8, 1992, at A1. A
diversionary drainage ditch has enabled the United States to remain in compliance with
the substantive obligations of the agreement. If the ditch is not replaced by a functioning
desalinization plant, however, politically unpopular steps will be necessary to curtail di-
versions of water in the upper Colorado. See Martin Van Der Werf, Desalting Plant:
White Elephant of Desert; $256 Million Facility Sits Idle Outside Yuma, ARIZONA REPUB-
LIC, Nov. 14, 1993, at A8 (discussing problems with expensive Yuma plant, and difficul-
ties meeting treaty water obligations to Mexico). Thus, a key aspect of the bilateral
agreement—the United States commitment to a “permanent and definitive” solution to
the salinity problem on the lower Colorado—has yet to be achieved.
172. Perhaps the clearest illustration of this resistance is provided by the Canadian-
American agreement on acid rain reached in 1991. The agreement commits both nations
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A number of interstate compacts in the United States also
contain substantive restrictions on pollutants. The best documented
is the Ohio River Valley Water Sanitation Commission, or
ORSANCO, established in 1948.173 This compact comprises eight
states that border the Ohio River and its major tributaries, and
provides, inter alia, for mandatory sewage treatment by all munici-
palities within the basin.174 ORSANCO is also authorized to
bring direct enforcement action against recalcitrant sources.175 Al-
though ORSANCO and other interstate water pollution compacts
suggest that meaningful collective action by interstate compact is
possible, in reality these agencies have played a relatively minor
to caps on sulfur and nitrogen oxide emissions and creates a dispute resolution frame-
work for tackling future controversies. See Agreement on Air Quality, March 13, 1991,
U.S.-Can., 30 I.L.M. 676 (1991). The agreement, however, requires only that the United
States carry out the reduction in emissions already mandated in the 1990 Clean Air Act
Amendments. See id. at 685–690. Thus, Canada secured nothing in the agreement by way
of additional limitations on emissions of precursor gases beyond what the United States
had already agreed to as a matter of domestic politics.
Similarly, while Mexico and the United States have reached bilateral agreements
about pollution reaching the United States from the Tijuana and New Rivers, see Nick
Johnstone, International Trade, Transfrontier Pollution, and Environmental Cooperation: A
Case Study of the Mexican-American Border Region, 35 NAT. RESOURCES J. 33, 43–44,
56–57 (1995); Margaret M. Sullivan, Comment, Transboundary Pollution from Mexico: Is
Judicial Relief Provided by International Principles of Tort Law?, 10 HOUS. J. INT’L L.
105, 108–09 (1987), implementation of these agreements has proved to be difficult. In
order to stem sewage overflows from the Tijuana, for example, the United States allows
much of the wastewater collected in Tijuana to be conveyed to a treatment facility in
San Diego. The United States, California, and San Diego have agreed to shoulder nearly
80% of the cost of constructing a new binational treatment plant on the United States
side of the border. See Johnstone, supra, at 46–48.
173. See EDWARD J. CLEARY, THE ORSANCO STORY: WATER QUALITY MANAGE-
MENT IN THE OHIO VALLEY UNDER AN INTERSTATE COMPACT 3 (1967). Other interstate
compacts that contain substantive limitations on interstate pollution include Delaware
River Basin Compact, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 7, §§ 6501, 6511 (1991) (setting up commis-
sion from Delaware, New Jersey, New York, and Pennsylvania to draw up plan to pro-
tect Delaware River Basin); New England Interstate Water Pollution Control Compact,
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 22a–309 (West 1995) (setting up commission between Con-
necticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, and Vermont to protect
streams, ponds, and lakes that flow in two or more states); Interstate Commission on the
Potomac River Basin, MD. CODE ANN., ENVIR. § 5–303 (1996) (setting up commission
with Maryland, West Virginia, Pennsylvania, Virginia, and D.C. to Protect the Potomac
River Basin). See generally BRUCE A. ACKERMAN ET AL., THE UNCERTAIN SEARCH FOR
ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY (1974) (analyzing the policymaking process involving the
Delaware River Basin Commission).
174. See Ohio River Sanitation Compact, OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 6113.01 (Banks-
Baldwin 1995).
175. See id.
FILE:C:\WP51\DLJ\MERRILL.PP Dec 12/06/97 Sat 10:53am
966 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 46 :931
role in transboundary pollution control efforts. They have tiny
budgets and seem to serve mostly to coordinate and generate sup-
port for state environmental enforcement actions.176 With the ad-
vent of federal statutes directly regulating point sources of pol-
lution in the 1970s, these agencies lost most of their original ratio-
nale, and many have ceased to function.
c. Agreements to cooperate. The vast majority of bilateral and
multilateral treaties dealing with transboundary pollution fall well
short of adopting either a liability regime or specific limitations on
transboundary pollutants. Some create joint commissions or
committees to address transboundary pollution problems. While
the functions of these bodies vary, they are commonly instructed
simply to gather and share information, and make recommenda-
tions for future bilateral or multilateral action.177 Apart from
these traditional investigatory and advisory roles, few commissions
are given the authority to reach final decisions that attribute
responsibility for transboundary pollution. Rather, any disputes
that arise typically must be referred to the contracting parties or
to the International Court of Justice.178
More commonly, bilateral and multilateral treaties simply
commit the parties to various forms of cooperation.179 Some re-
quire advance notification and consultation about potential trans-
boundary pollution problems.180 Others provide for exchanges of
information or research findings.181 Still others consist of vague
176. See CLEARY, supra note 173, at 214, 236–38. On the shortcomings of interstate
water pollution control compacts more generally, see James W. Curlin, Interstate Water
Pollution Compact: Paper Tiger or Effective Regulatory Device?, 2 ECOL. L.Q. 333 (1972);
N. William Hines, Nor Any Drop to Drink: Public Regulation of Water Quality Part II:
Interstate Arrangements for Pollution Control, 52 IOWA L. REV. 432 (1966).
177. See, e.g., Agreement on the Action Plan for the Environmentally Sound Manage-
ment of the Common Zambezi River System, May 28, 1987, art. 2(b) & Annex II, 2
SELECTED MULTILATERAL TREATIES IN THE FIELD OF THE ENVIRONMENT 389, 399–401
(Iwona Rummel-Bulska & Seth Osafo eds., 1991) [hereinafter SMT].
178. See, e.g., Agreement on the Yugoslavian-Hungarian Water Economy Commission,
Aug. 8, 1955, Yugo.-Hung., art. 9, 9 INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF THE ENVIRONMENT
4538, 4542 (Bernd Ruster & Bruno Simma eds., 1977).
179. See, e.g., Agreement Concerning the Regime on the Soviet-Polish State Frontier,
July 8, 1948, Pol-U.S.S.R., art. 17, 9 INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF THE ENVIRON-
MENT, supra note 178, at 4475, 4477.
180. See, e.g., Agreement for Co-operation in Dealing with Pollution of the North Sea
by Oil, June 9, 1969, art. 5, 704 U.N.T.S. 3, 6.
181. See, e.g., Convention for the Protection, Management and Development of the
Marine and Coastal Environment of the Eastern African Region, June 21, 1985, 2 SMT,
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provisions requiring simply that the parties employ “all appropriate
measures” to prevent transboundary pollution.182
On balance, the record of collective action by agreement is
not very impressive. The significance of the agreements that do
exist should not be denigrated. Of greater importance, however, is
the fact that the vast majority of boundary and cross-boundary
rivers and transboundary airsheds are not subject to any trans-
boundary pollution agreement; they are not even subject to an
agreement to cooperate in developing information. The record
reveals that meaningful bilateral or multilateral agreements can be
reached, at least in some circumstances. But in most parts of the
world, bilateral and multilateral agreements, like adjudications of
liability, are essentially nonexistent.
II. STRUCTURAL BARRIERS TO EFFECTIVE REGULATION
OF TRANSBOUNDARY POLLUTION
Transboundary pollution has long been perceived as present-
ing certain unique features relative to other international or
multijurisdictional environmental problems. In this Part, I will
consider what these structural features are, and how they may ac-
count for the general failure to achieve effective collective action
to deal with transboundary pollution.
supra note 177, at 324, 326.
182. See, e.g., Convention for Co-operation in the Protection and Development of the
Marine and Coastal Environment of the West and Central African Region, Mar. 23,
1981, 20 I.L.M. 746, 748 (1981) (requiring the parties to employ such measures). Like
their international counterparts, most interstate compacts also take the form of vague
agreements to cooperate and employ best efforts to resolve transboundary disputes. These
compacts frequently create commissions charged with setting water quality standards,
drafting and recommending legislation on pollution, and gathering and sharing informa-
tion. Such commissions may be granted the authority to hold hearings to determine
whether corrective action on the part of individual polluters is needed. See, e.g., Tennes-
see River Basin Water Pollution Control Compact, KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 224.18–780
(Banks-Baldwin 1992). But typically these rulings must be reviewed and can only be
enforced by state or federal courts. See, e.g., Klamath River Basin Compact, CAL. WA-
TER CODE § 5901 (West 1971). A number of compacts (including ORSANCO) create
commissions that are given their own enforcement powers, but these commissions have
such small budgets that these powers are rarely exercised. See supra text accompanying
note 176.
Similarly, attempts to stimulate less formal coordination and cooperation in regional
environmental planning have not been notably successful. See J.B. Ruhl, Interstate Pollu-
tion Control and Resource Development Planning: Outmoded Approaches or Outmoded
Politics?, 28 NAT. RES. J. 293, 309–13 (1988).
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A. The Salient Features of Transboundary Pollution
It will be useful to begin with a more precise definition of
transboundary pollution and a discussion of the characteristics
which distinguish it from other types of multijurisdictional environ-
mental problems. As used in this article, “transboundary pollution”
refers to a physical externality or spillover that crosses state lines.
More precisely, transboundary pollution occurs when a potentially
harmful environmental agent is released in one political jurisdiction
(the source state) and physically migrates through a natural medi-
um such as air, water, or soil to another political jurisdiction (the
affected state).183 Examples include sewage discharged into a riv-
er in one state that is transported downstream to another state,
and radiation released from a nuclear power plant in one state
that spreads over downwind states.
It is also useful, for analytical purposes, to note two other
multijurisdictional environmental problems.184 The first is multi-
183. This definition is similar to the definition of “transfrontier pollution” that was
adopted by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development Council: “any
intentional or unintentional pollution whose physical origin is subject to, and situated
wholly or in part within the area under, the national jurisdiction of one Country and
which has effects in the area under the national jurisdiction of another Country.” Organi-
zation for Economic Cooperation and Development: Council Recommendation on Imple-
menting a Regime of Equal Right of Access and Non-Discrimination in Relation to
Transfrontier Pollution, Annex, July, 1977, 16 I.L.M. 977, 979 (1977).
184. In addition to those mentioned in the text, one could also distinguish another
two phenomena: (1) damage to globally unique natural resources and (2) transboundary
shipment of hazardous wastes. The former occurs when unique resources located in one
state, such as an endangered species or a beautiful natural formation (such as the Grand
Canyon) are harmed. This can be of great concern to persons living in other states, but
the transjurisdictional effect is not a physical spillover but a psychological one—what
economists might call transjurisdictional injury to options values or existence values. See
Ohio v. United States Dep’t of the Interior, 880 F.2d 432, 475–76 nn.72, 73 (D.C. Cir.
1989); see generally Esty, supra note 4, at 594–97 (noting that psychological externalities
raise a “choice of public” issue). Because of these psychological spillovers, the destruction
of globally unique natural resources is likely to affect persons all over the world, in
contrast to the physical spillovers of transboundary pollution, where the effects are typi-
cally limited to two or a small number of states.
Transboundary shipment of hazardous wastes involves an environmentally harmful
agent generated in political jurisdiction A that enters political jurisdiction B pursuant to a
contract providing for the shipment or disposal of the wastes. Implicit in my definition of
transboundary pollution is the understanding that, because the movement of potentially
harmful environmental materials occurs in a natural medium like air or water, it takes
place without the consent of the affected state. If the movement occurs pursuant to a
contract, however, then the introduction of the potentially harmful environmental material
occurs with the consent of the affected state—or at least with the consent of a person
subject to the legal authority of the affected state. For this reason, transboundary ship-
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jurisdictional regulatory competition which may result if states are
free to set different environmental standards. The theory is that if
state A sets low environmental standards, investors in state B will
threaten to relocate to state A if standards are not similarly low-
ered in B.185 Such pressure from investors seeking the lowest en-
vironmental compliance costs, it is hypothesized, can set off a
“race to the bottom” in which many jurisdictions end up with
lower environmental standards than they would adopt absent this
pressure.186 The concern with regulatory competition involves a
pecuniary spillover—environmental standards in one state, through
the intermediation of capital flows, are posited to have a spillover
effect on environmental standards in another state. In structural
terms, this perceived pecuniary spillover is distinguishable from the
physical spillovers involved with transboundary pollution, however,
because regulatory competition is likely to affect a large number
ment of hazardous wastes also presents a different problem than transboundary pollution.
185. See Richard L. Revesz, Rehabilitating Interstate Competition: Rethinking the “Race-
to-the-Bottom” Rationale for Federal Environmental Regulation, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1210,
1216 (1992).
186. Serious questions have been raised about whether the race to the bottom concern
is valid. Some have questioned whether the theory underlying the concern is coherent.
See, e.g., id. at 1233–44. But cf. Peter P. Swire, The Race to Laxity and the Race to
Undesirability: Explaining Failures in Competition Among Jurisdictions in Environmental
Law, 14 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 67, 100–06 (1996) (arguing that Revesz overlooks the
public choice dimension that makes individual states uniquely susceptible to capture by
industry). Others have questioned whether the phenomenon, even assuming it exists, is
sufficiently important to have a major impact on industrial location decisions. See, e.g.,
Richard B. Stewart, Environmental Regulation and International Competitiveness, 102
YALE L.J. 2039, 2058–60, 2077–79 (1993). Still others have argued that the more impor-
tant dynamic is a “race to the top.” See DAVID VOGEL, TRADING UP: CONSUMER AND
ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY 248–70 (1995). I do not address
these questions here. Suffice it to say for present purposes that the perception of a possi-
ble race-to-the-bottom is widely shared by both environmentalists and local politicians,
and that this translates into a demand for centralization of environmental controls. A
recent prominent manifestation of this is the NAFTA side agreement on the environ-
ment. See North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation Between the Gov-
ernment of the United States of America, the Government of Canada and the Govern-
ment of the United Mexican States, Sept. 13, 1993, 1993 WL 645206 (Intl. Envtl. L.)
(establishing a Commission for Environmental Cooperation to coordinate the environmen-
tal protection efforts of the three countries). NAFTA seeks to raise the level of enforce-
ment of Mexican environmental laws in order to reassure persons in the United States
that trade liberalization with Mexico will not result in the flight of capital as businesses
seek the advantage of more lax environmental compliance standards in Mexico. See
Nicolas Kublicki, The Greening of Free Trade: NAFTA, Mexican Environmental Law, and
Debt Exchanges for Mexican Environmental Infrastructure Development, 19 COLUM. J.
ENVTL. L. 59, 100–06 (1994).
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of states, whereas the physical spillover ordinarily will affect only
two or a small number of states.
The second, distinguishable phenomenon can be called pollu-
tion of a commons. This phenomenon occurs when a potentially
damaging agent is released into physical space that is not subject
to the control of any identified sovereign, and then physically
migrates through a natural medium such as air or water to impose
harm on persons in one or more political jurisdictions. Examples
would include oil spilled from ships into a sea or ocean, which
then washes ashore; gases emitted into air which destroy the ozone
layer of the upper atmosphere, increasing surface levels of ultravi-
olet radiation around the world; and satellites launched into space
that crash to earth. Here, because the potentially damaging agents
do not immediately cross a border but rather are released into a
commons, any state that abuts on or has access to the commons
can be a source of the problem, and any state that abuts on or
has access to the commons can be affected by the problem. The
problem thus also typically implicates large numbers of states and
consequently again has structural features that differ from the
defining elements of transboundary pollution.187
Having distinguished transboundary pollution from these other
multijurisdictional phenomena in terms of its structural features, it
is also worth introducing two distinctions within the universe of
transboundary pollution. The first is the contrast—or perhaps more
accurately, the continuum—between total and partial transbound-
ary pollution. Total transboundary pollution occurs when a state
sets up a tall smokestack or outflow directly on the border with
another state, such that the entire quantity of pollution is directed
into the territory of the other state. Partial transboundary pollu-
tion, which is much more common, occurs when the source of
pollution is located so as to discharge only a portion of the pollu-
tion into another state. Partial transboundary pollution can obvi-
ously range from one to ninety-nine percent. As the percentage
falls, the portion of the problem internalized to the source state
rises, as does the prospect that the source state will adopt a regu-
latory response based on the costs incurred by its own residents.
187. The distinction between the structural features of transboundary pollution prob-
lems and commons problems is persuasively developed in STONE, supra note 24, at
50–95.
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The second distinction, also a continuum, is between unidirec-
tional and reciprocal transboundary pollution.188 The pure case of
unidirectional transboundary pollution occurs when all trans-
boundary pollution between two states moves in the same direc-
tion. State A always sends pollution in the direction of State B,
never vice versa. The pure case of reciprocal transboundary pollu-
tion occurs when, as between State A and State B, 50% of the
transboundary pollution flows one way, and 50% the other. Recip-
rocal pollution can occur over time, as where air pollution from
Detroit affects air quality in Windsor, Canada, on some days, and
air pollution in Windsor affects air quality in Detroit on other
days.189 Or it can occur simultaneously, as where two cities in
different countries share a single air shed and both discharge pol-
lutants into the air and simultaneously suffer harm from the result-
ing air quality.190
There are probably relatively few cases of either pure unidi-
rectional or pure reciprocal transboundary pollution. Usually there
will be some pollution going both ways, but on net one state will
be more of a source state and the other more of an affected state.
One example of a reciprocal pollution problem that typically has
unidirectional effects overall is acid rain. Because of persistent
patterns of prevailing upper atmospheric winds, some states emit
relatively large quantities of the gases that contribute to acid rain
relative to the amount of acid precipitation they incur, while oth-
ers incur large amounts of acid precipitation relative to the gases
they emit.191
188. See Esty, supra note 4, at 591 (“The direction of the flow of harms will also affect
the likelihood of achieving effective interjurisdictional cooperative policies.”).
189. See INTERNATIONAL JOINT COMMISSION, REPORT ON THE POLLUTION OF THE
ATMOSPHERE IN THE DETROIT RIVER AREA 5 (1960) (reviewing Detroit-Windsor air
pollution problems).
190. See Johnstone, supra note 172, at 39–40 (describing air pollution in the Ciudad
Juarez-El Paso air shed).
191. See BRUNEE, supra note 164, at 8–34. Acid rain is caused by pollutants like
sulphur oxides and nitrogen oxides from multiple sources, often located in multiple states.
These pollutants enter the upper atmosphere where they mix together with other chemi-
cals under the influence of sunlight, and return to earth often at a considerable distance
from the original sources as precipitation with high acid content. Prevailing winds often
mean that downwind states suffer disproportionately from acid rain relative to the
amount of precursor gases they emit. See JAMES L. REGENS & ROBERT W. RYCROFT,
THE ACID RAIN CONTROVERSY 41–47 (1988).
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B. A Model of Collective Action To Redress Multijurisdictional
Environmental Problems
In considering why the structural features of transboundary
pollution generally frustrate collective solutions, it will be useful to
have a model of the conditions that give rise to regimes of collec-
tive action in the multijurisdictional environmental context. To that
end, I will adopt an economic framework derived from Harold
Demsetz’ pioneering work on the emergence of property
rights.192 Under this model, collective action regimes arise in or-
der to reduce externalities of various types, be they physical, pecu-
niary, or psychological. However, any regime for collective ac-
tion—a long-term contract, a firm, a market, a system of private
property rights, or a government—entails certain costs. Demsetz
referred to these as “transaction costs,”193 a term that has certain
narrow connotations which may be misleading in the present con-
text.194 We can think of these costs more broadly as simply “re-
gime costs,” that is, any dedication of scarce resources that may be
required in order to create and maintain a structure for collective
action. Following Demsetz, then, the general criterion for deter-
mining when any type of collective action regime will arise is that
the benefits of the regime in terms of reducing externalities must
exceed the costs of creating and sustaining the regime.195
As refined by other analysts, the cost-benefit criterion for
predicting when collective action regimes will arise is not viewed
as an all or nothing proposition. Rather, the cost-benefit criterion
is seen as a condition underlying a progressive evolution of institu-
tional forms. If the benefits in terms of reduced externalities are
small, then the institutional response will be rudimentary (i.e., not
192. See Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV.
347 (1967). Demsetz’s model has been refined and extended to a variety of contexts, in-
cluding the emergence of markets, see David E. Van Zandt, The Market as a Property
Institution: Rules for the Trading of Financial Assets, 32 B.C. L. REV. 967, 975 (1991),
and the evolution of different forms of environmental regulation, see, e.g., Carol M. Rose,
Rethinking Environmental Controls: Management Strategies for Common Resources, 1991
DUKE L.J. 1, 8–12 (describing four models of how to manage the global commons).
193. See Demsetz, supra note 192, at 348–49.
194. The term “transaction costs” is often taken to refer to the costs of negotiating
and writing contracts. See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill, Trespass, Nuisance, and the Costs of
Determining Property Rights, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 13, 21–22 (1985). Collective action re-
gimes, as discussed here, include much more than negotiated contracts and, therefore,
greater costs.
195. See Demsetz, supra note 192, at 350.
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very costly). As the benefits of overcoming these problems become
progressively larger, the institutional response will become progres-
sively more sophisticated (i.e., more costly).196
The magnitude of the benefits from creating a collective ac-
tion regime will be a function of different variables in different
contexts.197 With respect to multijurisdictional environmental
problems, two factors seem especially relevant in determining the
magnitude of the benefits: 1) the seriousness of the external harm
that would be alleviated by establishing and maintaining a regime
of collective action; and 2) the frequency of that harm, that is,
how many states or persons within states are affected and how
often.
The seriousness of the external harm is a function of both ob-
jective and perceptual factors. For present purposes, we can simply
take it as a given that some externalities, such as the threat of
skin cancer from ozone depletion, are generally perceived as being
very serious harms;198 other external harms, such as haze in the
air that impairs visibility, are perceived as being less serious. The
significance of frequency of occurrence is self evident: the more
widely a harm is experienced, both in terms of the numbers of
states and persons within states affected and in terms of how often
they are affected, the greater will be the perceived need to invest
in a collective action regime to deal with that harm. The frequency
of harm can range from pervasive and continuous, as in the case
of exposure to ultraviolet radiation caused by depletion of the
ozone layer, to highly localized and episodic, as in the case of oil
spills.
196. See generally Rose, supra note 192, at 8–24 (making this point in the context of
explaining the evolution of environmental control regimes from those that do nothing, to
zoning, to technology-based controls, to market mechanisms). Each environmental control
regime discussed by Rose involves progressively higher regime costs, and will emerge
only when the benefits, in terms of alleviating progressively greater pressures on scarce
resources, increase. See id. at 24.
197. For example, in determining whether a private property system will emerge in a
given resource, the scarcity of the resource and the level of demand for it may be criti-
cal. See Demsetz, supra note 192, at 350–59. In determining whether an organized market
will emerge for a particular asset, important factors include the frequency of trading and
the costs of obtaining information about the asset. See Van Zandt, supra note 192, at
977–86.
198. See RICHARD ELLIOT BENEDICK, OZONE DIPLOMACY: NEW DIRECTIONS IN
SAFEGUARDING THE PLANET 20–22 (1991) (discussing the “harmful effects of ozone mod-
ification”); BRUNEE, supra note 164, at 79 (noting that if ozone depletion is stabilized at
2% by 2025, 114,000 new cases of skin cancer will be prevented).
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On the cost side, there are also two factors that seem espe-
cially relevant: 1) whether the interests of individual states are in
conflict or alignment with respect to the externality in question;
and 2) the number of states that must be induced to cooperate if
the collective action regime is to be effective.
The distinction between states with conflicting interests and
states whose interests are in alignment can be described in terms
of game theory. What I call a conflicting interest situation is one
where, even if a strategy of mutual cooperation would increase the
parties’ joint welfare, one party will always be worse off cooperat-
ing than it will be if it refuses to cooperate. This can be described
as a “cooperator’s loss” game.199 Noncooperation is always the
preferred strategy for the player who will be worse off, unless
some mechanism can be devised for transferring part of the collec-
tive gains to this player in order to induce him to switch to a
cooperative strategy.
In contrast, what I call an aligned interest situation can be
described in terms of the familiar prisoners’ dilemma game.200
Here again, a strategy of mutual cooperation will increase the
parties’ joint welfare, but now all parties will be better off if such
a strategy can be realized. Viewing the situation as a rational-ego-
istic actor, each party has an incentive not to cooperate, but if
some mechanism can be devised for inducing mutual cooperation,
the situation is potentially a positive-sum game for all.
199. See generally Adam L. Aronson, Note, From “Cooperator’s Loss” to Cooperative
Gain: Negotiating Greenhouse Gas Abatement, 102 YALE L.J. 2143, 2149–60 (1993).
Aronson coins the term “cooperator’s loss” to describe, in game-theory terms, the prob-
lem of global warming, where he assumes that both the United States and many less
developed countries would incur losses by cooperating in the formation of a greenhouse
gas regulation regime. The same analysis applies even more clearly to transboundary
pollution. Regime theorists in international relations have described transboundary pollu-
tion as an example of a “Rambo game.” See Martin List & Volker Rittberger, Regime
Theory and International Environmental Management, in THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICS
OF THE ENVIRONMENT 85, 98 (Andrew Hurrell & Benedict Kingsbury eds., 1992). This is
because the affected states, like certain dominant military powers, always have the upper
hand in the conflict and hence perceive themselves as losers under a regime of collective
action to reduce conflict. See id. I prefer the term “cooperator’s loss,” because it suggests
the solution to the non-cooperation problem: the creation of a mechanism for making
side payments from the winning states to those states that lose by entering into a co-
operative pollution regulation regime. See Aronson, supra, at 2156–58.
200. On the assumptions behind the prisoner’s dilemma, see ERIC RASMUSEN, GAMES
AND INFORMATION 17–19, 30–31 (2d ed. 1994).
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The distinction between conflicting interest or cooperator’s
loss situations and aligned interest or prisoners’ dilemma situations
is an important variable in determining the costs of regime forma-
tion. In both situations, it will be necessary to expend resources in
order to induce states to overcome rational-egoistic incentives not
to enter into a regime and to police against cheating or defecting
once a regime is formed. But in the cooperator’s loss situation, it
will also be necessary to devise a mechanism for making side
payments to the states for whom cooperation is never a rational
option. Thus, there must be a mechanism for taxing the winners
and transferring the proceeds to the losers in order to induce them
to enter the regime. Of course, the payment need not be in mon-
ey; various quid pro quos are possible. But the costs of creating
and maintaining this additional mechanism for side payments
makes it inherently more costly to create a collective action regime
in the conflicting interest situation than in the aligned interest
situation.
The second cost-related variable concerns the number of states
whose cooperation must be enlisted in order to make the regime
work. This variable derives from the standard assumption of both
transaction cost economics201 and the interest group theory of
politics202 that, because of holdout and free-rider problems, the
larger the number of parties involved, the more difficult it will be
to reach agreement on the formation and maintenance of a regime
for collective action. Thus, large numbers magnify the costs of col-
lective action, whether it be the formation of a contract (as in
transaction cost economics) or the enactment of new legislation (as
in the interest group theory of politics).203
Notice that the number of affected states appears on both the
benefit and the cost sides of the ledger. These factors cannot sim-
ply be netted out, however, because often the number or the iden-
201. See, e.g., A. Mitchell Polinsky, Resolving Nuisance Disputes: The Simple Econom-
ics of Injunctive and Damage Remedies, 32 STAN. L. REV. 1075, 1106–09 (1980) (discuss-
ing the relative desirability of damage and injunctive remedies when a polluter’s conduct
affects many victims who may “hold out” or “free ride” to maximize their own individual
welfare).
202. See, e.g., MANCUR OLSON, JR., THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC
GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS 58–60 (1965) (explaining that large groups may
have difficulty organizing to achieve common goals, even if perfect consensus exists).
203. For the equivalence between transaction cost economics and the interest group
theory of politics on this point, see NEIL K. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES:
CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS IN LAW, ECONOMICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY 105–22 (1994).
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tity of the states benefited by a regime will be different than the
number or identity of those whose cooperation is needed to effec-
tuate collective action. To take one example, consider the risk of
external harm in the form of injuries inflicted by falling satellites.
Virtually every state is susceptible to this risk. Thus, because it is
a large numbers problem on the benefit side, everything else being
equal, the benefits of collective action should be relatively large.
However, the only states whose cooperation is needed to establish
a regulatory or liability regime to redress such harm are those
with the technological capability of launching satellites—a much
smaller number. Thus, on the cost side, the problem of falling
satellites is a smaller numbers problem, suggesting that the costs of
achieving effecting collective action should be, again relatively
speaking, smaller than for some other problems.204
C. Applying the Model to Transboundary Pollution
Applying the foregoing model, it seems reasonable to con-
clude, at least as a general matter, that transboundary pollution is
a poor candidate for the emergence of an effective regime of
collective action relative to other types of multijurisdictional prob-
lems.
1. Seriousness of Harm. First, consider the seriousness of the
harm. Obviously, one can cite individual examples of serious
transboundary pollution, such as the salinization of the Colorado
River, radiation from the Chernobyl reactor, and the Sandoz
chemical spill. It is also clear that, to some extent, states have
deliberately pursued strategies of substituting transboundary pol-
lution for domestic pollution. For instance, both Great Britain and
many states in the United States have sought to minimize local
concentrations of air pollution by installing tall smoke stacks on
sources, thereby disbursing the pollution over greater distances and
often over other states.205 Nevertheless, there are several reasons
204. Together, consideration of the two “numbers” variables in this example suggests
that, putting aside other variables, effective collective action to deal with injuries from
falling satellites should be easier to achieve than it will be in some other types of
multijurisdictional environmental problems. And indeed, we find there is a relatively ro-
bust treaty imposing civil liability on launching states whose satellites cause damage. See
Space Objects Convention, supra note 157.
205. See Peter Huber, Electricity and the Environment: In Search of Regulatory Au-
thority, 100 HARV L. REV. 1002, 1034–35 (1987). This practice has since been prohibited.
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to believe that, as a general matter, transboundary pollution does
not present an especially serious form of harm relative to other
types of multijurisdictional environmental phenomena.
The first concerns a physical property of pollution, at least
pollution of the type involved in most transboundary pollution dis-
putes. As a rule, the further a pollutant moves from its source, the
less harm it does. In developing guidelines for models used to
calculate the harm from air pollution, for example, the EPA has
specified that, because “the air quality impact of many sources
falls off rapidly to insignificant levels,” no harm is presumed more
than 50 kilometers downwind from a source.206 Common water
pollutants like sewage and most industrial wastes also break down
as they travel through moving water over any distance.207
Most transboundary pollution is partial transboundary pollu-
tion, that is, it impacts the source’s local environment before it
reaches persons in the affected state. As a rough generalization,
therefore, the harm to persons in affected states from trans-
boundary pollution will be lower than the damages sustained by
victims in the immediate vicinity of the source. The Chernobyl
nuclear accident provides an illustration. After the accident, elevat-
ed levels of radiation were detected in at least eight downwind
states.208 But the immediate toll in terms of radiation sickness
and deaths was almost entirely confined to the Soviet Union.209
See 42 U.S.C. § 7423 (1994) (prohibiting states from using tall stacks or other dispersion
techniques to achieve compliance with air quality standards). See Revesz, supra note 4, at
2354–58.
206. National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants, 43 Fed. Reg. 26,388,
26,398 (1978). See Revesz, supra note 4, at 2362–63. Of course, some transboundary pol-
lution problems, most notably acid rain, are exceptions to the dissipation phenomenon.
See ROY GOULD, GOING SOUR: SCIENCE AND POLITICS OF ACID RAIN 7 (1985) (“[sul-
fur dioxide] from . . . ‘superstacks’ can be carried hundreds or even thousands of miles
downwind, remaining aloft long enough for a considerable fraction of the [sulfur dioxide]
to be converted to acid before returning to earth.”).
207. In determining whether water pollution sources violate effluent limitations, the
EPA generally adopts a rule of thumb that the impact of the discharge should be mea-
sured at a distance of 100 meters from the point of discharge—the so-called “mixing
zone.” See Marathon Oil Co. v. United States EPA, 830 F.2d 1346, 1349 (5th Cir. 1987).
Implicit in this rule is the judgment that the impact of a discharge on water quality
dissipates very rapidly over fairly short distances.
208. See Melanie L. Oxhorn, The Norms of Nuclear Accidents After Chernobyl, 8 J.
NAT. RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 375, 377 n.9 (1993).
209. See Terry Hall, “. . . Carried By The Wind Out To Sea” Ireland and the Isle of
Man v. Sellafield: Anatomy of a Transboundary Pollution Dispute, 6 GEO. INT’L ENVTL.
L. REV. 639, 650 (1994); Oxhorn, supra note 208, at 377. Some accounts predict that the
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The fact that most transboundary pollution is partial rather
than total leads to a second reason why the harm may be less
serious. The greater the portion of the pollution that falls within
the source state itself, the greater the incentive of the source state
(acting at the behest of its own citizens) to adopt some kind of
regulatory response. Given that part of the pollution costs are
externalized to another state, the source state will never have
perfect incentives to regulate. But to a degree, the persons within
the source state affected by the pollution will act as “virtual repre-
sentatives” of those in affected states.210 Insofar as these source
state victims convince the state to regulate the polluting activity,
even if only in part, the degree of harm that will befall those in
the affected state will also be diminished.
Finally, in recent years, central governments have been moti-
vated by concerns other than the prevention of transboundary
pollution to impose the adoption of pollution controls which have
reduced the potential harm from transboundary pollution. This is
especially true in the United States, where the national govern-
ment has for the last twenty-five years required that all new major
sources of pollution install expensive, technology-based control
devices to meet air and water quality standards.211 These require-
ments were not adopted out of concern for transboundary pollu-
tion, because they apply in equal measure to sources located well
inland of any neighboring state where the pollution could not do
any transboundary harm.212 Nevertheless, because these require-
ments also cover new major sources located near borders, they
undoubtedly reduce the total volume of transboundary pollution.
Consequently, they have also reduced the benefits of adopting a
long term effects of radiation exposure will result in premature deaths outside the former
Soviet Union, but they will almost certainly be of a much lower magnitude than prema-
ture deaths in the immediate vicinity. See id. at 378 n.19.
210. See DAVID L. SHAPIRO, FEDERALISM: A DIALOGUE 84 (1995); STONE, supra
note 24, at 50 (“Th[e] self-inflicted portion of the [transboundary] damage gives each
polluting nation some incentive . . . to clean up its own act.”).
211. See, e.g., Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7411 (1994) (standards for new stationary
sources); Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1316 (1994) (authorizing Ad-
ministrator to establish standards of performance for new sources).
212. The structure of the major federal pollution control acts strongly suggests that
the dominant motivation for federalizing environmental policy was concern about a race
to the bottom. See Revesz, supra note 185, at 1224–27; see also Thomas W. Merrill,
Panel III: International Law, Global Environmentalism, and the Future of American Envi-
ronmental Policy, 21 ECOLOGY L.Q. 485, 490 (1994) (noting that the federal environmen-
tal laws create an “environmental floor,” but not a ceiling).
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special regime for addressing the problem of transboundary pollu-
tion.213
Whether other types of multijurisdictional pollution problems
pose more serious harms will vary from problem to problem. The
general consensus among observers, however, is that at least some
paradigmatic examples of environmental commons problems, in
particular the depletion of the ozone layer and global warming,
present very serious threats to human health and welfare.214 Not
surprisingly, these problems have generated relatively elaborate
collective responses.215 The concern over regulatory competition
also presents the prospect of serious harm, if it is true that regula-
tory competition sets in motion a process that generally under-
mines effective regulation of local pollution problems. A defective
scheme for control of local pollution would presumably entail
substantial costs to every jurisdiction.
213. The NAFTA Side Agreement on the Environment, which calls for increased lev-
els of environmental enforcement among the parties in order to reduce incentives for a
race to the bottom, is another example of how a regime adopted for purposes other than
control of transboundary pollution can have the potential to directly diminish the harm
from transboundary pollution. See Charnovitz, supra note 2, at 313 (criticizing the Side
Agreement as “rather shallow,” but concluding that at a minimum, it offers “new possi-
bilities for promoting cooperation, and for spotlighting national enforcement efforts on
pollution and pesticide use.”). Similarly, environmental regulations adopted at the Com-
munity level in the European Union, even if motivated by a desire to achieve harmoniza-
tion of individual state standards, will still have the effect of reducing the need for
transboundary pollution controls.
214. See George W. Rathjens, Energy and Climate Change, in PRESERVING THE
GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT: THE CHALLENGE OF SHARED LEADERSHIP 154, 160–63 (Jessica
Tuchman Mathews ed., 1991) (global warming); Richard Elliot Benedick, Protecting the
Ozone Layer: New Directions in Diplomacy, in PRESERVING THE GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT,
supra at 125–33 (ozone depletion).
215. The Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, Sept. 16,
1987, 26 I.L.M. 1550 (entered into force Jan. 1, 1989), is widely regarded as the most
complete and effective regime of international environmental regulation ever adopted, and
is cited as a model for use in attacking other international environmental problems. See
Benedick, supra note 214, at 129–30. No binding regime dealing with global warming has
yet emerged, but tremendous energy has been devoted in the diplomatic community and
elsewhere devising a meaningful regime for tackling this problem. See United Nations
Conference on Environment and Development: Framework Convention on Climate
Change, May 9, 1992, at 1, U.N. Doc. A/AC.237/18 (Part II)/Add.1 (1992), reprinted in
31 I.L.M. 849 (1992); United Nations Conference on Environment and Development: Rio
Declaration on Environment and Development, June 14, 1992, at 1, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.151/5 (1992), reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 874 (1992).
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2. Frequency of the Problem. Next, consider the frequency of
transboundary pollution. Other things being equal, the benefits of
collective action to alleviate a problem that affects most states
most of the time are likely to be greater than the benefits of
collective action to address a problem that affects only some states
some of the time. Given the observed physical properties of
pollutants that cross state lines, transboundary pollution typically
affects only two states or at most, a small number of states.216
Transboundary pollution is also commonly episodic in nature, for
example, it may result from an accident like the explosion of the
nuclear reactor at Chernobyl or the Sandoz chemical spill.
Additionally, some geographically large states, like Russia, or
geographically isolated states, like Great Britain or Australia, may
have no experience or only limited experience with transboundary
pollution. These states will have little incentive to participate in or
contribute to a regime for regulating transboundary pollution.
In contrast, other types of multijurisdictional environmental
problems are far more pervasive. Both environmental commons
and regulatory competition involve problems that are, almost by
definition, of concern to large numbers of states. A commons
problem is one that harms resources shared in common by many
or all states. Thus, a threat to an environmental commons is nec-
essarily a problem for all the states that participate in the com-
mons. The concern over regulatory competition is also a continu-
ous and widespread problem, at least if one believes the story that
competition will lead to a race to the bottom. The race to the
bottom results in environmental standards in all jurisdictions being
set at suboptimal levels, and thus is also necessarily a pervasive
concern.217
3. Conflicting Interests. Turning to the cost side of the
equation, transboundary pollution presents the classic illustration of
a conflicting interests or cooperator’s loss situation.218 The basic
216. See supra text accompanying notes 206–07.
217. Damage to globally unique natural resources also presents a pervasive problem,
in the sense that persons all over the world will feel a sense of loss if species are extin-
guished or places of great beauty despoiled, see supra note 184.
218. See List & Rittberger, supra note 199, at 98–99. For a detailed analysis of the
reciprocal incentives of the source state and the affected state to try to externalize costs
to the other, see Revesz, supra note 4, at 2374–94.
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problem is that the costs and benefits of the polluting activity and
of regulation of that activity are symmetrically opposed between
the source state and the affected state. If transboundary pollution
is permitted to persist unregulated, then the source state internal-
izes (most of) the benefits of polluting activity and externalizes
(some of) the costs to the affected state. If transboundary pol-
lution is regulated, then the affected state internalizes (some of)
the benefits of reduced pollution, and externalizes (all or nearly all
of) the costs to the source state. The symmetrical opposition of
the costs and benefits of regulation means that a noncooperative
strategy always dominates for the source state: failure to agree
upon a regime of regulation corresponds to a victory for the
source state (benefits internalized, costs externalized) and a loss
for the affected state. Concomitantly, agreeing upon a regime of
regulation corresponds to a victory for the affected state (benefits
internalized, costs externalized) and a loss for the source state.
Given this pattern of conflicting interests, any regime of col-
lective action created to deal with the problem must provide off-
setting compensation to the source state. Joint social welfare may
be maximized by collective action, but the source state stands only
to lose from participating in such a regime. Thus, it will refuse to
cooperate unless some other benefit or advantage of greater value
can be linked to its agreement to participate in a collective action
regime.
Various mechanisms for providing such off-setting compensa-
tion are possible. Perhaps the most straightforward would entail
identifying some type of reciprocal transboundary pollution. If a
reciprocal problem exists, then one transboundary problem can be
solved by pairing it with another problem running in the opposite
direction; the two states can then adopt a regime which covers
both problems. Another possible solution would be to pair
nonpollution related benefits, such as trade concessions to the
source state, with an agreement to abate transboundary pollu-
tion.219
219. For an interesting proposal along these lines, see Barbara K. Bucholtz, Coase and
the Control of Transboundary Pollution: The Sale of Hydroelectricity under the United
States-Canada Free Trade Agreement of 1988, 18 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 279, 316
(1991). In this article, which was written shortly before the United States and Canada
concluded their acid rain agreement, see supra note 172, the author suggested that the
United States agree to reduce its emissions of gases contributing to acid rain in Canada
in exchange for Canadian exports of below-market hydroelectric power to the United
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Other, more creative compensation mechanisms may also be
possible. Consider, for example, the acid rain provisions of the
1990 Clean Air Act amendments.220 Acid rain in the United
States is a complex transboundary pollution problem in which
midwestern states centered around the Ohio Valley are seen as
predominant source states, and states in the New England and
Adirondack regions are seen primarily as affected states.221 For
nearly two decades, the midwestern states consistently blocked any
meaningful federal regulation of acid rain, because they perceived
that their citizens would end up paying higher utility bills while
the benefits would largely inure to the citizens of New England
and Adirondack states.222 The impasse was finally broken by an
agreement to create a system of tradeable emissions allowances to
achieve these reductions.223 The key feature of the system, in
terms of overcoming the objections of the source states, was an
agreement to give the bulk of the allowances in the initial round
of the program to midwestern utilities.224 Thus, the added costs
of emissions reductions were offset in large part by the new wealth
given to these utilities in the form of valuable allowances which
could be traded to other sources for cash.
Other multijurisdictional environmental problems present more
of an aligned interests or prisoners’ dilemma situation. Both envi-
ronmental commons problems and regulatory competition may
entail situations of this nature.225 That is, both may create cir-
cumstances in which each state will end up worse off if it pursues
its own interests in isolation than if it can somehow agree to coop-
erate with other states in pursuit of a common goal. In either case,
the possibility of reaching a cooperative solution transforms the
situation into a potential positive-sum game. Collective action may
be difficult to achieve in these situations because of free-rider
problems, but if these problems can be overcome, there are poten-
tial gains for all involved.226
States. See Bucholtz, supra, at 312–16.
220. See 42 U.S.C. § 7651 (1994).
221. See REGENS & RYCROFT, supra note 191, at 42–47.
222. See WILCHER, supra note 164, at 66; Malley, supra note 162, at 838–39.
223. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7651–7651o.
224. See Lisa Heinzerling, Selling Pollution, Forcing Democracy, 14 STAN. ENVTL. L.J.
300, 328–332 (1995).
225. On the problem of the commons as a prisoner’s dilemma, see RUSSELL HARDIN,
COLLECTIVE ACTION 16–37 (1982). On the race-to-the-bottom as a prisoner’s dilemma,
see Revesz, supra note 185, at 1217–19.
226. The problem of transboundary shipment of hazardous wastes is likely to present
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4. Small Numbers. In one respect transboundary pollution
problems should be more amenable to collective action than other
types of multijurisdictional environmental problems. Transboundary
pollution disputes typically involve a relatively small number of
states (often only two).227 In effect, given the principles of state
responsibility and parens patriae, the states act as agents by
consolidating the interests of many affected individuals on both
sides of the border; they should therefore be able to reduce what
would ordinarily be a large numbers nuisance dispute into a diadic
or small numbers dispute.
Scholars writing in the tradition of transaction cost economics
have sometimes assumed that virtually any small numbers dispute
should be amenable to resolution through collective action in the
form of a Coasean bargain.228 Obviously, this is not what we ob-
serve with respect to transboundary pollution disputes. There are
several reasons why small numbers alone do not guarantee
Coasean bargains in this context.229
Perhaps the most important consideration, which is under-
scored by the model presented in this Article, is that the presump-
tive advantages that derive from small numbers of parties must be
weighed against the other three factors, which as we have seen are
generally not favorable to collective action against transboundary
pollution. Thus, even if only a small number of parties are in-
volved, the affected states will have to devise some mechanism for
providing offsetting compensation to the source state. Direct pay-
ments of cash may be prohibited by law or may be unacceptable
for political reasons.230 And even if the offsetting compensation
a less costly issue for effective collective action, because it involves a phenomenon in
which the parties are already linked by a contract. The existence of the contract suggests
that the interests of the states are not in sharp conflict—there are potential gains from
trade to both sides. The contract also provides a ready mechanism for conditioning the
introduction of the potentially harmful material in ways that protect the interests of the
affected state, again in contrast to the situation with respect to transboundary pollution.
227. See supra text accompanying notes 206–07.
228. See supra note 18.
229. Two additional problems considered in Part III are the lack of clear legal
entitlements and the absence of a central enforcement mechanism. See infra text accom-
panying notes 253–59.
230. In Trail Smelter, the tribunal reported that disputes over pollution in Washington
State from smelters on the United States side of the border were handled by the compa-
nies purchasing smoke easements from farmers. The tribunal was informed, however, that
under the law of Washington, foreign firms were prohibited from acquiring this kind of
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problem can be solved, the total costs must be less than the bene-
fits of establishing the regime; as we have seen, there is reason to
believe that the benefits may be relatively low.
Sometimes, of course, transboundary pollution involves large
numbers of parties. Acid rain is the primary example of a
transboundary pollution problem that typically involves both nu-
merous source states and numerous affected states. Here, of
course, we encounter a major paradox. Although acid rain is the
primary example of a transboundary pollution problem that does
not involve small numbers, it is also the primary example of a
transboundary pollution problem that has resulted in meaningful
collective regulation. At the very least, this outcome again under-
scores the need to consider multiple factors in explaining the per-
ceived pattern of regulation in this area of law.
D. Explaining the Current Pattern of Transboundary Pollution
Regulation
The foregoing model can help explain a number of the fea-
tures of the current state of transboundary pollution regulation.
First, it can explain why there are very few multijurisdictional
regimes that impose either liability or regulatory limits on
transboundary pollution. The conditions are not favorable for the
emergence of a general regime of regulation for transboundary
pollution. Such a regime is especially unlikely given that most
transboundary pollution problems are perceived as being relatively
isolated and localized disputes. People tend to focus on this partic-
ular transboundary air pollution problem or that particular
transboundary water pollution problem; the ones they focus on, of
course, are the ones that have an immediate impact on them. As
long as people perceive transboundary pollution this way, then any
proposal to adopt a global or regional regime to deal with such
problems will tend to be regarded as a small numbers problem
with regard to benefits, but a large numbers problem with regard
to costs. Only if people and nation-states come to view each indi-
vidual transboundary dispute as just an example of a more generic
phenomenon that affects nearly everyone (including themselves)
property right. See Trail Smelter (U.S. v. Can.), 3 R.I.A.A. 1911, 1917–18 (1935). Thus,
legal rules prohibited international Coasean bargains. Analogous problems would no
doubt arise in having affected states make payments to source states in return for agree-
ments to desist in polluting.
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are we likely see significant support for a generalized regime of
regulation of transboundary pollution; this is unlikely for the time
being given popular perceptions about pollution disputes.
Second, the model can help explain why the “law in books”
does not necessarily coincide with the “law in action.” If the law
in books prescribes an institutional response that entails costs that
exceed the benefits derived from that response, then the law will
be ignored.231 Sometimes it will be ignored in favor of other
methods of achieving collective ends, such as informal social con-
trols.232 Other times, as in the case of the United States environ-
mental statutes dealing with transboundary pollution, the law in
the books will never be translated into meaningful relief by those
charged with administering it.
The reality is that a legal system does not act like a machine,
automatically churning out the prescribed response to identified
problems. Instead, it represents a kind of regulatory commons,233
where effective action is dependent upon alliances of groups over-
coming collective action barriers and pressuring administrators to
respond. If structural factors act as an impediment to achieving
effective regulation in the international arena, it is not unlikely
that they will also frustrate effective collective action within a
developed legal system. Congress can say that no state may inter-
fere with the achievement of ambient air standards in another
state, but getting the EPA to enforce this mandate is another
matter.
Third, the model helps explain why transboundary pollution is
more likely to be addressed through bilateral and multilateral
agreements designed to address specific transboundary pollution
problems than through global or regional regimes of liability or
regulation. As we have seen, transboundary pollution typically
231. A famous example of this phenomenon involves the original hazardous air pol-
lution provisions of the 1970 Clean Air Act which were so draconian they were virtually
never enforced. See John P. Dwyer, The Pathology of Symbolic Legislation, 17 ECOLOGY
L.Q. 233, 250–82 (1990) (explaining that the EPA strategically delayed adoption of emis-
sion standards and effectively rewrote statutory provisions in its implementing regula-
tions).
232. See ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW 130–36 (1991).
233. See James E. Krier, The Tragedy of the Commons, Part Two, 15 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL’Y 325, 338 (1992) (noting that a government does not coerce the public of its
own accord, but rather the public must organize “to coerce the government to coerce
it”).
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involves a small numbers dispute,234 which is fertile soil for
Coasean bargains. To be sure, the other factors that vex effective
collective action against transboundary pollution also apply.235
Still, to the extent that collective action is possible, one would
expect to see it most often in the form of bilateral or limited
multilateral agreements, because this exploits the one structural
advantage of transboundary pollution disputes—the small numbers
of parties typically involved. And indeed, as we have seen in Sec-
tion I.B, the regimes that impose meaningful substantive limita-
tions on such pollution are nearly all based on bilateral or limited
multilateral agreements.236
Fourth, the model helps explain why, aside from acid rain,
most of the examples of meaningful regulation of transboundary
pollution that exist relate to the pollution of boundary waters.237
Pollution of boundary waters involves elements of both partial and
reciprocal transboundary pollution. Consider pollution entering the
upper Rhine River along the border between Germany and
France. From the German perspective, such pollution will be par-
tial transboundary pollution, because it will not only affect other
states bordering on the Rhine but also German cities and farms
downstream from the point of discharge. In addition, the pollution
has a strong reciprocal element: pollution emanating from the
German side will effect French cities and towns, but at the same
time pollution emanating from the French side will affect German
cities and towns.
The partial pollution aspect of boundary water pollution
means that, insofar as each country agrees to enter a regime of
collective regulation, it will be agreeing in part to regulate for the
benefit of its own citizens. Thus, there is a significant domestic
political benefit from entering into such a regime. The reciprocal
pollution element means that, to the extent that the collective
regime regulates transboundary pollution affecting persons in other
states, there will be a rough quid pro quo in the form of reduc-
tions in transboundary pollution coming from the other direction.
234. See supra text accompanying notes 206–07.
235. See supra Section II.C.
236. See supra text accompanying notes 157–76.
237. Examples include multilateral agreements limiting certain kinds of pollution of the
Rhine River, see supra note 169; the 1909 Boundary Waters Treaty between the United
States and Canada, see supra note 84; and numerous bilateral European treaties, see, e.g.,
supra notes 177–81.
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The pollution that Germany agrees to regulate that would other-
wise affect France is matched, in an approximate way, by the pol-
lution that France agrees to regulate that would otherwise affect
Germany.238
Finally, the model can help explain the apparent anomaly that
acid rain, the one transboundary pollution problem that most
clearly involves large numbers of parties, has met with fairly elab-
orate collective institutional responses in both Europe and North
America. First, although acid rain technically falls within the defi-
nition of transboundary pollution, in many respects it more closely
resembles an environmental commons problem. Because acid rain
is formed by complex chemical reactions in the upper atmo-
sphere,239 it has sources in many states and it affects many states,
much the way ozone depletion or global warming operate. Thus,
acid rain is a high frequency problem, both in the sense that it is
a matter of concern to large numbers of states and in the sense
that it is a relatively continuous problem. This translates into
greater benefits from establishing a regime for collective action.
It is also significant that acid rain entails a considerable ele-
ment of partial pollution. Here the partial element is not so much
the fact that acid rain falls on source states as well as other states,
but rather the fact that a source state that agrees to reduce
emissions of the precursor gases of acid rain—principally sulfur
dioxide and nitrogen oxides—also obtains benefits for its own
citizens in the form of reduced levels of conventional ground level
air pollutants. If power plants in Indiana cut their sulfur dioxide
emissions by 50 percent in order to curb acid disposition in
Adirondack lakes, this also has the effect of relieving the distress
of asthmatics in Indiana. These localized benefits thus help sweet-
en the pill for source states of adopting tough acid rain regula-
tions.
On the cost side, the commons-like features of acid rain mean
that, at least for some states, acid rain bears the indicia of a
238. The fact that the pollution is reciprocal also helps temper extreme demands from
any one state for complete abatement by the others. For example, it has been suggested
that the United States acquiesced to something less than complete abatement of the
pollution from the smelter in Trail, British Columbia, because the U.S. was worried about
the impact of an absolute rule for pollution emanating from Detroit and Buffalo into
Canada. See John E. Read, The Trail Smelter Dispute, 1 CAN. Y.B. INT’L L. 213, 224–25
(1963).
239. See supra note 191.
FILE:C:\WP51\DLJ\MERRILL.PP Dec 12/06/97 Sat 10:53am
988 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 46 :931
prisoners’ dilemma game. To be sure, there are states that are
primarily either source states or affected states. For these states,
the problem is highly conflictual. But there are also a number of
important states, like Sweden and Germany in Europe and Penn-
sylvania, New Jersey, and West Virginia in the United States,240
that act both as source states and as affected states. For these
states, acid rain presents more of a prisoners’ dilemma type prob-
lem, in the sense that although they will experience costs from
agreeing to a system of collective regulation, they will also enjoy
substantial benefits. Collective regulation for these states is thus a
potential positive-sum game; under the right circumstances they
may form an alliance with the more purely affected states in sup-
port of regulation.
III. WHAT DOES LAW HAVE TO DO WITH IT?
The foregoing structural and institutional account of trans-
boundary pollution disputes contains relatively little discussion of
the law. Perhaps that is just as well, for one reading of this ac-
count is that effective regimes of collective action regulating
transboundary pollution are not very likely to emerge, no matter
what the law says. The basic insight of the structural and institu-
tional account is that collective regulation of transboundary pollu-
tion will not occur unless the benefits to the involved parties ex-
ceed the costs, and the analysis set forth in Part II indicates that
this criterion will not be satisfied very often. Thus, any discussion
of the legal norms that should govern transboundary pollution
disputes may be just idle speculation: the quintessential example of
an arid debate about legal doctrine having no appreciable payoff.
The foregoing account suggests a second, less obvious reason
why we should arguably not spend much time considering the legal
norms that govern transboundary pollution disputes. Effective
regulation of transboundary pollution is probably more likely to
come about indirectly, through the evolution of other institutions,
rather than directly through the adoption of regimes dedicated to
adjudicating transboundary pollution disputes. For example, the
240. See GREGORY S. WETSTONE & ARMIN ROSENCRANZ, ACID RAIN IN EUROPE
AND NORTH AMERICA: NATIONAL RESPONSES TO AN INTERNATIONAL PROBLEM 52, 79
(1983) (Swedish and German positions); THE U.S. NATIONAL ACID PRECIPITATION AS-
SESSMENT PROGRAM, 1990 INTEGRATED ASSESSMENT REPORT 178–96 (1991) (comparing
emissions of precursor gases and acidity of deposition in U.S. states).
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creation of a more effective multijurisdictional regime to deal with
the perceived problem of regulatory competition could result in a
greater commitment to the enforcement of existing local pollution
controls.241 This commitment, in turn, would have the indirect ef-
fect of reducing transboundary pollution. Alternatively, using the
law to encourage free trade and other types of interdependencies
among states could result in more opportunities to provide off-
setting benefits to source states in exchange for their agreement to
establish transboundary pollution controls. The law that truly mat-
ters, it can be argued, is that which determines whether these
other types of multijurisdictional regimes emerge; efforts at legal
reform should therefore concentrate on these issues.
A. Why Legal Norms Matter
These dismissive reactions about the legal norms governing
transboundary pollution are not without force. Nevertheless, I
believe that the legal norms assumed to apply to transboundary
pollution disputes do in fact matter, at least at the margins.
Whether the benefits of collective action exceed the costs depends
on the magnitude of those costs, and one variable that influences
the size of those costs will be the legal rules presumed to apply in
resolving transboundary pollution disputes. Thus, it is reasonable
to assume that a set of cases exists in which meaningful collective
action could be achieved under one legal rule, but not under an-
other; the presumed existence of this set of cases justifies giving
some consideration to the content of the legal rules.
Moreover, the balance of benefits and costs is fluid and con-
stantly changing. Given continued population growth and economic
development, it is not implausible that the benefits of achieving
effective regulation of transboundary pollution may increase as
time passes. The content of the legal rules presumed to apply to
such disputes could function as a “tipping point” determining when
failure and frustration turn to success. With better legal norms, the
tipping point could come earlier than it would come with dysfunc-
tional legal norms; once that point is reached, better norms could
241. A good example of this is the NAFTA side agreement on the environment,
which creates a mechanism designed to encourage more effective enforcement of domestic
environmental regulations by the signatory states (the target of concern being Mexico).
See Charnovitz, supra note 2, at 260–61.
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mean that regimes for controlling transboundary pollution would
spread more quickly.
Finally, the law can do little if anything to change many of
the structural and institutional factors that frustrate collective ac-
tion against transboundary pollution. The content of the legal
norms, however, is one variable that is clearly subject to human
modification through debate and discussion—especially when the
precedents and hard sources of law defining those norms remain
thin and undeveloped. Human energies are best channeled in dir-
ections where they can have some influence, and with respect to
transboundary pollution this may include consideration of the
applicable legal norms. Thus, while at first it may appear that legal
commentators have devoted a disproportionate amount of atten-
tion to identifying the correct legal norms governing transboundary
pollution,242 their energies may not be entirely misplaced.
The skeptic might reply that legal norms will have little or no
significance without some kind of central authority with the power
to enforce the norms. There are several responses to such an argu-
ment. First, with respect to much transboundary pollution, such a
central authority already exists. Transboundary pollution within
federal systems like the United States, Canada, and Australia is
susceptible to adjudication by national tribunals. In the United
States, as we have seen,243 the Supreme Court formerly adjudi-
cated such disputes, and the EPA has the authority to do so today
under the Clean Air Act and the Clean Water Act. Although sur-
prisingly little effective regulation has emerged in the U.S. context,
this may be due in part to the application of inappropriate legal
norms. Similarly, a quasi-federal structure is emerging in Europe in
the form of the European Union. One can easily imagine how an
institution like the European Court of Justice could be given the
task of adjudicating transboundary pollution disputes by issuing
decrees having direct effect within the member states of the Euro-
pean Union.244
242. An example would be the extensive debate over the meaning of the Trail Smelt-
er arbitration and whether international law incorporates a rule of strict liability. See, e.g.,
supra notes 102–06.
243. See supra Section I.A.1.
244. See J.H.H. Weiler, The Transformation of Europe, 100 YALE L.J. 2403, 2413–22
(1991) (explaining the doctrine of “direct effect” and its interplay with other doctrines in
the European Union).
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Second, even where states are not already subject to the coer-
cive authority of a central system of courts, they can always agree
to subject their disputes to authoritative resolution by such an
institution. Thus, one option in any transboundary pollution dis-
pute is to submit the matter to the International Court of Justice
or to an international arbitration panel. Presumably, the nature of
the legal norms that the parties assume will be applied in resolving
the dispute in an agreed-upon adjudicative setting will be an im-
portant variable in determining the frequency with which states
elect this option.
Third, even when the parties forego litigation or arbitration of
their disputes, the legal norms that are assumed to apply will
provide an important negotiating point in bilateral or multilateral
discussions about other types of collective solutions.245 It always
counts for something in a negotiation to be able to say that one’s
position is consistent with the law, or that the opposing side’s po-
sition is not. Moreover, establishing that one’s position conforms
to the law may influence the attitudes of bystander states, as well
as of the media and public opinion. These forces may bring pres-
sure to bear on the parties in a way that influences the out-
come.246 Thus, even in a situation where litigation or adjudication
is not a realistic option, the content of the legal norms carries
rhetorical and moral force in deliberations about the problem.
Fourth, if the parties successfully negotiate a bilateral or mul-
tilateral solution to the problem, the legal norms that have been
developed (if only in the writings of publicists) will tend to oper-
ate as a baseline against which specific negotiated solutions are
developed.247 Thus, if the legal norms are sound in the sense of
245. See Bodansky, supra note 133, at 116–19 (“[I]nternational environmental norms
can play a significant role by setting the terms of the debate, providing evaluative stan-
dards, serving as a basis to criticize other states’ actions, and establishing a framework of
principles within which negotiations may take place to develop more specific norms, usu-
ally in treaties.”).
246. A dramatic illustration of this influence is the determination that a state has vio-
lated human rights provisions recognized by international law. See, e.g., Convention for
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S.
221 (obligating participating European nations to respect the basic human rights of their
citizens).
247. For example, in the Law of the Sea Treaty negotiations, the parties assumed that
the existing 12 miles of territorial sea, which had been established as a matter of custom-
ary law, was the norm. This required states arguing for an expansion of the territorial
sea (for instance, Chile) to give up bargaining points in exchange for partial recognition
of its position. See generally Anthony D’Amato, The Law-Generating Mechanisms of the
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providing a constructive and realistic solution to the problem,
negotiated solutions are more likely to be sound. This outcome in
turn will enhance the chances that the parties will actually adhere
to rather than ignore the negotiated solutions and it will increase
the prospect that other states will join in, or emulate, the negotiat-
ed regime.
B. What’s Wrong with Strict Liability
1. The Litigate-or-Settle Analogy. What can we say more
specifically about the influence of legal norms in resolving
transboundary pollution disputes? One way to consider how legal
norms might be important in this context is to reconsider the
matter from the perspective of achieving Coasean bargains. As we
have seen, bilateral and limited multilateral agreements are the
most promising avenue for achieving meaningful collective action
regulating transboundary pollution.248 How might the legal norms
that are assumed to apply to transboundary pollution disputes
affect the frequency and the effectiveness of such agreements?
Commentators have advanced a number of theories to explain
why background legal rules might effect the parties’ ability to
reach Coasean bargains in a small numbers dispute. These factors
have usually been considered in the context of explaining why
parties decide to proceed to trial rather than to settle litiga-
tion.249 Most lawsuits involve only a small number of parties, and
all lawsuits involve deadweight losses to the parties in the form of
attorneys fees and costs; hence in each case there are potential
gains to be divided among the parties if a settlement can be
reached. Although most suits settle before trial, some do not.250
Law of the Sea Conferences and Convention, in CONSENSUS AND CONFRONTATION: THE
UNITED STATES AND THE LAW OF THE SEA CONVENTION 125, 131–35 (Jon M. Van
Dyke ed., 1984) (describing how vote trading was influenced by customary international
law rule).
248. See supra text accompanying notes 164–76.
249. For an overview, see Robert D. Cooter & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Economic Analy-
sis of Legal Disputes and Their Resolution, 27 J. ECON. LITERATURE 1067, 1075–82
(1989) (discussing factors to be considered in deciding whether to settle a dispute or go
to trial).
250. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 554 & n.1 (4th ed.
1992) (citing studies finding that only 2% of automobile accident claims go to trial, and
less than 10% of medical malpractice claims are litigated); Marc Galanter & Mia Cahill,
“Most Cases Settle”: Judicial Promotion and Regulation of Settlements, 46 STAN. L. REV.
1339, 1340 (1994) (reporting that two-thirds of all civil cases settle “without a definitive
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Commentators have considered various ways in which the nature
of the background legal rules applicable to the suit might influence
the rate of failures to reach mutually advantageous Coasean bar-
gains in this small numbers setting.
One theory is that the failure to reach Coasean bargains is
caused by uncertainly about the outcome if the case goes to tri-
al.251 The argument is that each party will have a limit on the
price it will accept or pay for a settlement; this price will in part
be a function of the party’s prediction of the outcome. If the
parties’ predictions are the same or if one party is more pessimis-
tic about a favorable outcome than the other, then a settlement
will be reached, because the parties can do better by settling and
dividing the savings in litigation expenses. But if each party is
optimistic about a favorable outcome, they will litigate.252 This
view suggests that the law can increase the incidence of Coasean
bargains by making the law more predictable, thereby reducing the
number of cases in which both parties are more optimistic than
their opponents about their chances of prevailing at trial.253
A second theory is that cases fail to settle because of strategic
behavior by the parties.254 In maneuvering over the division of
the gains from trade, parties will sometimes take “hard” bargaining
positions in the hope of getting the lion’s share for themselves.
Often this works: one party takes a hard position and the other
responds with a soft position in order to preserve the possibility of
settlement. Other times both parties take soft positions, in which
case a deal is quickly reached. Occasionally, however, both parties
stake out hard positions, and this results in a bargaining break-
down.255 Generally speaking, this theory implies that “it is desir-
able for the law to eliminate the worst threats which the parties
can make against each other.”256 In other words, legal rules
judicial ruling”).
251. See id. at 554–60; Keith N. Hylton, Asymmetric Information and the Selection of
Disputes for Litigation, 22 J. LEGAL STUD. 187, 187 (1993); William M. Landes, An Eco-
nomic Analysis of the Courts, 14 J.L. & ECON. . 61, 67–68 (1971).
252. See Landes, supra note 251, at 67–68.
253. The usual way of doing this would be to increase the number of precedents in
any given area of the law. See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Legal Prece-
dent: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, 19 J.L. & ECON. 249, 271 (1976).
254. See ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 484–87 (1988).
255. See id at 487–91.
256. Robert Cooter et al., Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: A Testable Model of
Strategic Behavior, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 225, 247 (1982).
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should be designed to minimize the credibility of hard positions
advanced in bargaining.
A third theory, which can be seen as a variation on either the
first or the second, is that bargaining can fail even in low trans-
action cost settings because the parties possess private information
about their preferences which they either conceal or deliberately
distort in negotiations with the other party.257 The unique contri-
bution of focusing on private information is that some legal rules
have the effect of forcing the parties to disclose all or part of this
private information, which in turn will make it more likely that
Coasean bargains can be reached. For example, one rule often
followed in the dissolution of two-person partnerships requires the
dissolving partner to name a price and then allows the other part-
ner either to sell to, or to buy out, the dissolving partner at that
price.258 Such a rule obviously constrains the dissolving partner to
select a price that accurately reflects the dissolving partner’s assess-
ment of the true worth of the enterprise; deviating in either direc-
tion creates an opportunity for the other partner to secure a wind-
fall.259
Synthesizing these academic contributions, it would seem that
the legal system can best facilitate Coasean bargains in small num-
bers settings by adopting rules that: 1) make it relatively easy for
the parties to predict the outcome if no agreement is reached; 2)
offer minimal opportunities for either party credibly to take ex-
treme or threatening positions toward the other party; and 3) force
parties to disclose information about their true valuations of the
possible outcomes to the dispute. Presumably, no legal rule will
perfectly embody all three of these attributes; there will have to
be some trade offs.260 The relevant question is comparative: how
does the current consensus view about the appropriate legal norm
governing transboundary pollution—a universal norm of strict
liability for any pollution that causes significant harm in the affect-
257. See Ian Ayres & Eric Talley, Solomonic Bargaining: Dividing a Legal Entitlement
to Facilitate Coasean Trade, 104 YALE L.J. 1027 (1995).
258. See id. at 1072.
259. This rule bears an obvious resemblance to the cake cutting game, in which one
child cuts the cake and the other gets to chose which piece to eat. See WILLIAM
POUNDSTONE, PRISONER’S DILEMMA 43, 52–53 (1992).
260. To take a familiar conundrum, predictability will generally be advanced by bright
line rules, but bright lines rules create opportunities for strategic behavior.
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ed state—fare under these criteria, and is it possible to identify
another norm that would satisfy these criteria better?
2. Why Strict Liability Exacerbates Bargaining Breakdown.
Whatever one might say in support of strict liability,261 it does
not stack up well when measured against these criteria. First, the
rule of strict liability, at least in its current formulation, does not
lead to predictable results. On its face, the strict liability rule
would seem to provide a predictable standard of conduct, at least
once the significant injury threshold is crossed. But the problem is
that the parties do not know which version of “the law” to turn to
in assessing their rights and obligations: the official version in the
books or the version that applies in practice. The official version
suggests a predictable rule that is highly protective of affected
states; the version that applies in practice also suggests a pre-
dictable rule, but one that favors source states.262 This gulf
between official norms and actual practice complicates the process
of reaching negotiated solutions because it makes it very difficult
to assess how any particular transboundary pollution problem
would be resolved if it were actually adjudicated either in a court
of law or in the court of public opinion.
261. It might be argued that Coasean bargains are frustrated by the failure to be
sufficiently strict about strict liability. In other words, if the legal regime in fact rigor-
ously enforced a rule of liability against source states causing non de minimus pollution
in affected states, this would establish a clear baseline of entitlements, which would in
turn lead to more frequent bilateral agreements. But this argument overlooks the differ-
ence between imposing clear entitlement rules (and injunction remedies) in thick markets
with low transactions costs, and imposing such a rule (and remedy) in a thin market with
only two or a very limited number of parties. See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill, The Econom-
ics of Public Use, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 61 (1986) (providing a rationale for eminent
domain based on bargaining breakdown in “bilateral monopoly” situations). As Robert
Cooter and others have argued, imposing clear assignments of entitlements and injunction
remedies in two-party markets often leads to strategic bargaining and the frustration of
Coasean trades. See supra notes 249–59 and accompanying text.
Another and very different argument might be that a rule of strict liability sends a
clear message about the importance of protecting environmental values, and thus may
help shape public preferences in the direction of greater environmental protection. See
Richard B. Stewart, Regulation in a Liberal State: The Role of Non-Commodity Values, 92
YALE L.J. 1537, 1578–79 (1983); Cass R. Sunstein, Endogenous Preferences, Environmental
Law, 22 J. LEGAL STUD. 217, 229–30 (1993). I believe that there is merit to this argu-
ment, but its force is considerably weakened if the regime of strict liability never gets off
the ground, so that the norm comes to be perceived as merely aspirational rather than
“real.”
262. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 142–51 (discussing futility of efforts to
obtain relief under the Clean Air Act).
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Second, the strict liability norm seems designed to maximize,
not minimize, the opportunities for the parties to take “hard” posi-
tions in strategic bargaining. Under the norm, each side can argue
that legal resolution of the dispute would result in complete vindi-
cation of its position, and a complete vanquishment of the other’s.
The ability to make these arguments is likely to be threatening to
each side. As Christopher Stone has observed: “A nation whose
pollution has been challenged but which is denied, under the strict
liability doctrine, an opportunity to defend on the grounds that its
actions were reasonable or that the damage was unforeseeable, will
be that much less likely to consent to be sued.”263 The affected
state, on the other hand, will be concerned that by “going to the
law” it will end up with nothing, most likely because the source
state will refuse to assent to any adjudication of the problem at
all. The ability of each party to make credible threats to wipe out
the other side’s legitimate interests under the norm of strict liabili-
ty thus increases the potential for strategic moves that lead to bar-
gaining breakdown.
Third, the existing rule does little to compel the parties to
disclose private information. The affected state might be content
with a regime of partial regulation, but the strict liability regime
provides no occasion for this to be brought out. To the contrary,
the rule creates an incentive for the affected state to exaggerate its
injuries, in order to meet the significant harm threshold that trig-
gers strict liability. Alternatively, the source state might be willing
to adopt certain control measures, but the structure of the strict
liability norm militates against any concession that regulation of
any type is warranted. Such a concession would imply that the
source state bears some causal responsibility for the harm, and the
rule creates an incentive for the source state to deny all causal
connection.
If strict liability does a poor job of encouraging the formation
of meaningful collective action regimes, is there an alternative
conception of the legal norms that might do better? To consider
one such possibility, I propose to return to the ultimate source of
today’s customary international law of transboundary pollution: the
original jurisdiction decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court on the
subject rendered in the first three decades of this century. As we
263. STONE, supra note 24, at 62.
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have seen,264 these decisions have been interpreted as adopting a
norm of strict liability for transboundary pollution clearly causing
significant injury. I will suggest, however, that these decisions may
be read another way—a way that leads to a different and poten-
tially more promising conception of the applicable legal norms.
IV. THE SUPREME COURT AND THE GOLDEN RULES
The conventional reading of the Supreme Court’s original
decisions on transboundary pollution is the one adopted by the
Trail Smelter arbitration panel.265 The panel interpreted these de-
cisions as establishing a legal norm that looks much like one vision
of the common law of nuisance:266 all transboundary pollution is
subject to a single universal standard, which requires a threshold
finding that the source state has clearly caused “significant” harm
in the affected state. Once that threshold is crossed, the source
state is strictly liable, and the presumptive remedy is automatic in-
junctive relief.
A careful re-reading of these cases, however, suggests that
they do not articulate a universal rule applicable to all trans-
boundary disputes. Rather, they regard each dispute as the occa-
sion to identify a unique “equitable” solution to the relevant prob-
lem, i.e., one that is sensitive to the respective needs and interests
of both states. The spirit of these decisions is not that of a search
for the one “true” rule, but rather a concern with maintaining
peace among neighbors.
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court’s decisions do not provide
much guidance about the underlying principles to be used in iden-
tifying solutions to transboundary pollution disputes that are equi-
table in this sense. The last three decisions from the 1920s and
264. See supra Section I.A.
265. See supra text accompanying notes 96–101.
266. One could describe this as a late–nineteenth century vision. The notion that
nuisance law entails a balancing of the gravity of the harm to the plaintiff versus the
social utility of the defendants’ conduct is relatively modern, and dates from the RE-
STATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS §§ 822, 826 (1939). An older and rival tradition regarded
a nuisance as an intentional interference with property rights, and avoided a balancing
test approach. See MORTON J. HOROWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW
1870–1960, at 28 (1992); Robert G. Bone, Normative Theory and Legal Doctrine in Amer-
ican Nuisance Law: 1850 to 1920, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 1101, 1159–60, 1160 n.126 (1986).
For a modern reformulation of a rule-like vision of nuisance law, see Richard A.
Esptein, Nuisance Law: Corrective Justice and Its Utilitarian Constraints, 8 J. LEGAL
STUD. 49 (1979).
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early 1930s, in particular, are rather sorry examples of “equity”
decisionmaking in the form of ad hoc intuitionism. But some of
the decisions, especially Missouri v. Illinois,267 contain the seeds
of a potentially promising strategy for identifying situation-specific
equitable solutions based on norms that are immanent in the
parties’ own conduct in regulating their internal affairs. The Court
articulated this alternative strategy in terms of a traditional maxim
of equity: one who seeks equity must do equity.268 I will speak
of this strategy in terms of two inter-state golden rules:269 the
“reverse golden rule”—do not ask of other states what you do not
ask of your own citizens—and the “golden rule”—do unto other
states as you do to your own citizens.
A. Missouri v. Illinois
As recounted earlier, Justice Holmes’ opinion in Missouri v.
Illinois270 addresses three issues: the source of law to be applied,
the “principles” of that law, and the application of those principles
to the sharply disputed facts presented by Chicago’s engineering
feat in reversing the flow of the Chicago River. However, interna-
tional law sources like the Trail Smelter decision have paid rela-
tively little attention to what Holmes actually said in the one para-
graph where he attempted to define the principles that should
guide resolution of the case. It is set forth here in full:
As to the principle to be laid down the caution necessary is
manifest. It is a question of the first magnitude whether the
destiny of the great rivers is to be the sewers of the cities along
their banks or to be protected against everything which threatens
their purity. To decide the whole matter at one blow by an irre-
vocable fiat would be at least premature. If we are to judge by
what the plaintiff itself permits, the discharge of sewage into the
Mississippi by cities and towns is to be expected. We believe that
267. 200 U.S. 496 (1906).
268. Missouri v. Illinois, 200 U.S. at 523, 525–26.
269. The classic formulation of the “golden rule” is from Jesus’ Sermon on the
Mount: “[W]hatever you wish that men would do to you, do so to them.” Matthew 7:12.
Similar prescriptions are found in the teachings of a variety of world religions. See
George P. Smith, II, Nuisance Law: The Morphogenesis of an Historical Revisionist The-
ory of Contemporary Economic Jurisprudence, 74 NEB. L. REV. 658, 673–74 (1995) (not-
ing that cousins to the “golden rule” not only occur in Judaism and Stoicism but also in
historically Asian religions like Buddhism and Hinduism).
270. 200 U.S. 496; see also supra text accompanying notes 31–50.
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the practice of discharging into the river is general along its
banks, except where the levees of Louisiana have led to a differ-
ent course. The argument for the plaintiff asserts it to be proper
within certain limits. These are facts to be considered. Even in
cases between individuals some consideration is given to the
practical course of events. In the black country of England par-
ties would not be expected to stand upon extreme rights. Where,
as here, the plaintiff has sovereign powers and deliberately per-
mits discharges similar to those of which it complains, it not only
offers a standard to which the defendant has the right to appeal,
but, as some of those discharges are above the intake of St.
Louis, it warrants the defendant in demanding the strictest proof
that the plaintiff’s own conduct does not produce the result, or at
least so conduce to it that courts should not be curious to appor-
tion the blame.271
The Trail Smelter panel and ensuing commentators have es-
sentially focused only on the last sentence, and only on the
thought that the affected state’s own practices “warrant[] the de-
fendant in demanding the strictest proof that the plaintiff’s own
conduct does not produce the result.”272 This statement of course
supports the conventional view of the holding of Missouri v. Illi-
nois—that the plaintiff state must prove by clear and convincing
evidence that it has suffered actual injury.273
But reading Missouri v. Illinois as a case announcing a general
standard for proof of causation elides the balance of the discussion
in the paragraph, and in particular discounts the fact that it alludes
twice to the equitable doctrine of clean hands—that one who seeks
equity must do equity. The first time the doctrine is mentioned,
Holmes remarks that it is a “fact[] to be considered.”274 Toward
the end of the paragraph the idea is stated in even more unequiv-
ocal terms: “Where, as here, the plaintiff has sovereign powers and
deliberately permits discharges similar to those of which it com-
plains, it . . . offers a standard to which the defendant has the
right to appeal.”275 Of all the statements thrown off in this key
paragraph, this remark is the one that perhaps comes the closest
271. 200 U.S. at 521–22 (citations omitted).
272. Id. at 522.
273. See, e.g., New York v. New Jersey, 256 U.S. 296, 309 (1921); Trail Smelter (U.S.
v. Can.), 3 R.I.A.A. 1905, 1965 (1949).
274. 200 U.S. at 522.
275. Id.
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to sounding like a “principle to be applied,” that is, a rule of deci-
sion.
Moreover, the opinion keeps reverting to the clean hands
doctrine in its review of the evidence. In discussing Missouri’s
epidemiological evidence, for example, Holmes notes that “[t]he
plaintiff obviously must be cautious upon this point, for if this suit
should succeed many others would follow, and it not improbably
would find itself a defendant to a bill by one or more of the
States lower down upon the Mississippi.”276 In the concluding
summary of the evidence, Holmes returned to the in pari delicto
theme once again:
The evidence is very strong that it is necessary for St. Louis to
take preventive measures, by filtration or otherwise, against the
dangers of the plaintiff’s own creation or from other sources than
Illinois. What will protect against one will protect against anoth-
er. The presence of causes of infection from the plaintiff’s action
makes the case weaker in principle as well as harder to prove
than one in which all came from a single source.277
This last remark may perhaps provide the clearest indication of
how Holmes viewed the relevance of Missouri’s own derelictions.
It was relevant both to the standard for determining liability and
to proof of liability. It not only made it “harder to prove” that the
Illinois discharges had created a danger to the population of Mis-
souri above and beyond that created by Missouri’s own discharges,
it also made “the case weaker in principle.”278
276. Id. at 523.
277. Id. at 525–26.
278. Id. at 526. A possible objection to reading Missouri v. Illinois as resting on an
application of the clean hands doctrine is that Missouri was in fact asserting that Illinois
had done something very different than what Missouri itself was doing. Everyone was
dumping raw sewage into rivers. Id. at 521-22. But only Illinois had engaged in a massive
public works project to reverse the natural flow of a river and send sewage in the oppo-
site direction from where it would travel without human intervention. Missouri was asking
the Court to enjoin another state’s interference with the natural flow of the river in
order to divert sewage to a neighboring state, something which Missouri itself had never
done.
Significantly, however, Holmes anticipated and answered this objection. He noted in
the penultimate paragraph of the opinion that the dredging of the canal and reversal of
the river flow had been sanctioned by two acts of Congress, “the validity of which is not
disputed.” Id. at 526. This put the reversal of the flow beyond challenge, because, as
Holmes had explained in an earlier part of the opinion, a public nuisance is an offense
against the laws of the sovereign, and in an original suit in the Supreme Court, the
sovereign is the federal government. See id. at 518 (discussing Pennsylvania v. Wheeling
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In short, although the Missouri v. Illinois opinion can be read
as establishing a high standard for proof of actual injury, it can
also be read as resting on the equitable doctrine of clean hands.
Read in this fashion, the decision in effect endorses the reverse
golden rule: in a transboundary pollution case, the affected state
cannot demand that the source state adhere to a higher standard
than the affected state applies to its own citizens.
B. Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co.
Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co.279 came hard on the heels
of Missouri v. Illinois and seems oddly inconsistent with the earlier
decision. One discontinuity is the absence of any direct reference
to the clean hands or in pari delicto reasoning that so dominates
Missouri v. Illinois.280 The short explanation for the absence of
any such discussion is that the clean hands defense was not raised
by the defendant copper smelters.281 The smelters raised three
& Belmont Bridge Co., 54 U.S. (13 How.) 518 (1851)). Accordingly, the only act of
which Missouri could complain was the discharge of sewage into the rivers draining into
the Mississippi, and Missouri itself was guilty of the same conduct. See id. at 522. As
Holmes put it: “Of course these acts [of Congress] do not grant the right to discharge
sewage, but the case stands no differently in point of law from a suit because of the
discharge from Peoria into the Illinois, or from any other or all the other cities on the
banks of that stream.” Id. at 526.
279. 206 U.S. 230 (1907).
280. See supra text accompanying notes 51–66.
281. There are several reasons why the copper smelters did not raise the unclean
hands defense. One was simply a matter of timing. The initial complaint and the record
in Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co. were compiled in 1905, see supra note 56; Missouri
v. Illinois did not come down until 1906. When Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co. was
again set for hearing by the Supreme Court in 1907, the parties stipulated that it should
be decided on the original, that is, pre-Missouri v. Illinois, record. Id. Thus, there was no
opportunity to develop evidence responsive to the “principles” of Missouri v. Illinois.
A second reason was that the copper smelters had achieved a qualified measure of
success in earlier litigation in state court, when the Tennessee Supreme Court ruled that
although the sulphur fumes were a nuisance, the proper remedy was damages rather than
injunctive relief. See Madison v. Ducktown Sulphur, Copper & Iron Co., 83 S.W. 658,
666–67 (Tenn. 1904). Perhaps influenced by this degree of success, the defendants concen-
trated on the same argument in the Supreme Court. See Tennessee Copper, 200 U.S. at
235.
A third reason is that there is no suggestion in the record that Georgia was itself
discharging or permitting the discharge of any sulphur fumes in the northwest corner of
the state which were commingled with the fumes discharged by the copper smelters in
Tennessee. See id. at 234–39. Thus, the case did not present a direct parallel to Missouri
v. Illinois. In order to make the clean hands or in pari delicto argument, counsel would
have had to have the imagination to investigate Georgia’s regulatory behavior in other
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principal defenses: 1) the action was not a true public nuisance
suit but rather a collection of private nuisance suits that Georgia
was improperly seeking to assert in a representative capacity; 2)
Georgia’s suit was barred by laches; and 3) the Supreme Court,
like the Tennessee Supreme Court, should balance the equities and
limit Georgia to a damages remedy.282 The Supreme Court, in
perfectly conventional fashion, considered and rejected each of
these defenses.283 Having resolved the issues presented by the
parties, the Court entered judgment accordingly.284 Although the
clean hands defense of Missouri v. Illinois was not placed at issue
in Tennessee Copper, Holmes penned a short paragraph announc-
ing that the Court was satisfied that the “requirements” of the
earlier case had been met.285 This paragraph sheds little light on
the Court’s understanding of those requirements.286
The paragraph does, however, contain the following cryptic
statement: “Whether Georgia by insisting upon this claim is doing
parts of the state, and then invoke this as evidence relevant to the appropriate decisional
rule to apply to the controversy in the northwest corner. This was too far of a leap,
especially given the lack of time to assimilate the message of Missouri v. Illinois.
282. See Brief and Argument of the Defendant Tennessee Copper Company on Final
Hearing, at 88–119, Tennessee Copper, 206 U.S. 230 (filed Feb. 25, 1907), [hereinafter
Tennessee Copper Brief]; Brief and Argument of the Defendant Ducktown Sulphur, Cop-
per and Iron Company, Limited, on the Final Hearing, at 50–81, Tennessee Copper, 206
U.S. 230 (filed Feb., 21, 1907). It was also argued that the record in the case failed to
establish that the complaining parties in Georgia had suffered sufficient injury to warrant
equitable relief. See Tennessee Copper Brief, at 102–07.
283. See Tennessee Copper, 206 U.S. at 237–39.
284. See id. at 239.
285. See id. at 238–39.
286. Nevertheless, there is language in this paragraph that casts doubt on the ortho-
dox reading of those principles as requiring “clear and convincing” proof of causation. In
discussing the standard of liability in the latter case, the Court said it was satisfied “by a
preponderance of evidence” that the fumes “cause and threaten damage on so consid-
erable a scale” so as to make out a case “within the requirements of Missouri v. Illi-
nois.” Id. at 238–39. Moreover, in the next paragraph of the opinion, rejecting a defense
of laches, Holmes observes that “the plaintiff now finds, or thinks that it finds, that the
tall chimneys in present use cause the poisonous gases to be carried to greater distances
than ever before and that the evil has not been helped.” Id. at 239. The opinion con-
cludes that “[i]f the State of Georgia adheres to its determination, there is no alternative
to issuing an injunction.” Id. Together, the impression one gets from these comments is
that insofar as the issue of causation was concerned, the Court viewed the requirements
of Missouri v. Illinois as more of a pleading rule than a demand for proof of injury,
clear and convincing or otherwise. As long as fumes could be seen and smelled in Geor-
gia, and Georgia asserted that its rights were being infringed upon by this intrusion from
out of state, Georgia had satisfied whatever causation requirement was germane in a
transboundary context.
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more harm than good to her own citizens is for her to deter-
mine.”287 Conceivably, this could be an allusion to the possibility
that some Georgia citizens were employed by, or otherwise had
economic interests in, the Tennessee works and would be harmed
if they shut down.288 But it is also possible that the comment
was intended to express the same thought conveyed in Missouri v.
Illinois, where Holmes had observed that if Missouri’s “suit should
succeed many others would follow, and it not improbably would
find itself a defendant to a bill by one or more of the States lower
down upon the Mississippi.”289 The idea that interstate disputes
should be resolved in accordance with norms of reciprocal applica-
tion was in fact a theme that Holmes adverted to several times in
his long judicial career.290
In other words, it is possible to read Georgia v. Tennessee
Copper Co. as signalling the Court’s continued desire to resolve
transboundary pollution disputes in terms of norms of reciproci-
ty.291 On this reading, Georgia, by insisting on certain conduct
from out-of-state sources, was implicitly appealing to a standard
that it too would be required to live by. Georgia prevailed in the
case because the defendants presented no evidence to show that
Georgia was itself violating the standard to which it appealed.
287. Id.
288. Support for this reading is supplied by the fact that Georgia cited the economic
injury to its own citizens as a reason for seeking postponement of injunctive relief after
it prevailed and was given the right to enjoin the nuisance. See Motion for Leave to
Postpone Entry of Final Decree, at 2–3, Tennessee Copper, 206 U.S. 230 (filed Oct. 21,
1907).
289. Missouri v. Illinois, 200 U.S. 496, 523 (1906).
290. See Bean v. Morris, 221 U.S. 485, 487 (1911) (“We believe that it always was as-
sumed . . . that the States were willing to ignore boundaries and [allow] the same rights
to be acquired from outside the State that could be acquired from within.”); Rickey
Land & Cattle Co. v. Miller & Lux., 218 U.S. 258, 260–67 (1910) (in a water rights
dispute spanning two states, either court may exert jurisdiction, taking into account and
accommodating the law of the other state); Mannville Co. v. City of Worcester, 138
Mass. 89, 90–91 (1884) (“[I]f the substantive end to be obtained is a proper one, it will
be recognized and acted on here, as we have no doubt that it would be in Rhode Island
if the position of the parties were reversed.”). Not surprisingly, the idea is also featured
in the Court’s water apportionment decisions, most prominently Kansas v. Colorado, 206
U.S. 46 (1907). In that case, the Court stated: “As Kansas thus recognizes the right of
appropriating the waters of a stream for the purposes of irrigation, subject to the condi-
tion of an equitable division between the riparian proprieters, she cannot complain if the
same rule is administered between herself and a sister State.” Id. at 104–05 (emphasis
added).
291. See ROBERT V. PERCIVAL ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LAW, SCIENCE
AND POLICY 99 (2d ed. 1996).
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Nevertheless, the state was warned that it would be expected to
abide by that standard in the future.
C. New York and New Jersey
The last three original decisions—one suit filed by the State of
New York against New Jersey and two by New Jersey against the
City and State of New York, respectively292—add little to our
understanding of the skeletal statements about the applicable legal
principles contained in Missouri v. Illinois and Georgia v. Tennes-
see Copper Co. One of the cases, involving the proposed construc-
tion of a sewage outflow from the Passaic River in New Jersey
into New York Bay,293 gives further credence to the orthodox
interpretation of Missouri v. Illinois; but it also supports this
Article’s revisionist interpretation. The Court announced for the
first time (in so many words) that the plaintiff state must prove by
“clear and convincing” evidence that the defendant state’s conduct
poses a threat of incremental harm beyond that resulting from
background levels of pollution.294 But the opinion also stressed
that New York was just as guilty or more guilty of the conduct by
New Jersey of which it was complaining.295 The Court suggested
that this conduct provided an independent reason for denying New
York’s request for equitable relief.296 Thus, New York v. New
Jersey can be read as carrying forward the reverse golden rule
theme introduced in Missouri v. Illinois.
292. See New Jersey v. City of New York, 283 U.S. 473 (1931); New Jersey v. New
York, 283 U.S. 336 (1931); New York v. New Jersey, 256 U.S. 296 (1921).
293. See New York v. New Jersey, 256 U.S. at 300.
294. See id. at 309.
295. The Court took note of New Jersey’s allegation, in its answer, that the City of
New York discharged seven times the amount of sewage into New York Bay as was pro-
jected to flow from the Passaic sewer line, and that New York’s sewage, up to that time,
was entirely untreated. See id. at 303. The Court relied on this in rejecting New York’s
claim that the project would threaten damage to vessel hulls and create a risk of air-
borne diseases. See id. at 309–10. New York also maintained that the proposed treatment
method would lead to offensive odors and “oily and sleek fields” on the surface. Id. at
310. The Court found the expert testimony on this point conflicting, and also found it
“of much significance” that New York City had recently embarked upon a project of
treating its sewage in a manner “very similar to, but not so extensive and thorough as,”
that proposed by New Jersey. Id. at 311.
296. See id. at 309–11 (“[W]hen it is considered that . . . all of the sewage from . . .
New York City . . . has been discharged into the harbor, quite untreated, the evidence
does not justify the conclusion that . . . such waters can sustain much further damage
from the addition to them of the sewage of the Passaic Valley . . . .”).
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More importantly, none of the three cases approaches the
problem as one requiring the articulation of a universal legal
norm. In keeping with the admonition of Missouri v. Illinois that
“the destiny of the great rivers” should not be decided “at one
blow by an irrevocable fiat,”297 each of the three opinions is very
fact-intensive, and resolutely avoids generalizations. By the 1930s,
the Court was using special masters to take evidence about these
disputes. Like a court reviewing an arbitration, these later deci-
sions proceed by reviewing and deferring to the particular findings
and recommendations of the special master.298 The cases also ad-
vance the theme of reciprocity, and the need to find a solution
that is satisfactory to both states in the sense that it will bring
about peace between neighbors. As it had in the first two trans-
boundary pollution disputes, the Court continually reverted to the
idea that “[d]ifferent considerations come in when we are dealing
with independent sovereigns having to regard the welfare of the
whole population and when the alternative to settlement is
war.”299
In terms of jurisprudential development, the New York-New
Jersey cases are undoubtedly too fact-intensive. Much like the
interstate water apportionment decisions of the same era,300 they
seek an equitable solution to each particular dispute, but do so in
a way that provides virtually no guidance to either the Court itself
or other parties in future controversies. Even if the Court was not
prepared to establish a fixed rule to govern transboundary pollu-
tion disputes, the Court would have better served posterity by
297. Missouri v. Illinois, 200 U.S. 496, 521 (1906).
298. See New Jersey v. New York, 283 U.S. at 343–46 (1931); New Jersey v. City of
New York, 283 U.S. at 477–83 (1931).
299. New Jersey v. New York, 283 U.S. at 342. See also North Dakota v. Minnesota,
263 U.S. 365, 372–73 (1923) (noting that the Constitution confers jurisdiction over inter-
state disputes to the Supreme Court “as a substitute for the diplomatic settlement of con-
troversies between sovereigns and a possible resort to force”).
300. See Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U.S. 589, 618 (1945) (noting that “[p]riority of
appropriation is the guiding principle,” but that the court must engage in a “delicate
adjustment of interests” to ensure that its apportionment is equitable); Connecticut v.
Massachusetts, 282 U.S. 660, 670–71 (1931) (declining to resolve dispute by applying com-
mon law of riparian rights, and instead considering “the pertinent laws . . . and all other
relevant facts . . . [to] determine what is an equitable apportionment . . . of such wa-
ters”); Wyoming v. Colorado, 259 U.S. 419, 495–96 (1922) (dividing available water on
the basis of prior appropriation); Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 117 (1907) (dismissing
the complaint of the State of Kansas because defendant’s water diversions resulted in an
“equitable division of benefits”).
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making an effort to elaborate on the “principles” of Missouri v.
Illinois, if only to identify the kinds of factors that are relevant in
resolving individual disputes.
The important point here, however, is that the very absence
of any reference to universal norms speaks volumes about the
Court’s understanding of the basic approach established in Missou-
ri v. Illinois and Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co. In contrast to
the Trail Smelter panel, for example, the Supreme Court did not
view its own decisions as laying down any general rule governing
all transboundary pollution disputes. Whatever the “principles” of
Missouri v. Illinois and Tennessee Copper, they were understood
by the Court to be fully consistent with an approach grounded in
principles of equity, reciprocity, and neighborly accommodation.
D. The OECD Principles and the Golden Rule
Although two of the Supreme Court’s five original decisions
expressly invoke the clean hands doctrine—what I have called the
reverse golden rule—none alludes to the possibility of applying the
golden rule. For this idea, we must fast forward to the 1970s, and
the minority tradition in soft international law which calls for
adoption of a norm of reciprocity in resolving transboundary pollu-
tion disputes. In particular, the OECD Principles Concerning
Transfrontier Pollution, released in 1974, urge that such disputes
be approached through what they call a principle of “nondiscrimi-
nation”:301 source states should apply the same pollution control
standards to persons residing in other states as they apply to their
own citizens,302 and should afford the same procedural rights to
persons residing in other states as they afford to their own citi-
zens.303
Like the reverse golden rule of Missouri v. Illinois, the golden
rule of the OECD Principles would resolve transboundary pollu-
tion controversies by adopting a norm that one of the parties to
the dispute has demonstrated it is prepared to impose on itself. In
Missouri v. Illinois, that norm came from the conduct of the plain-
tiff—the affected state. Under the OECD Principles, the norm
derives from the conduct of the defendant—the source state.304
301. OECD Recommendation, supra note 118, at 242.
302. See id.
303. See id. at 245.
304. See id.
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Both the reverse golden rule and the golden rule share the same
general strategy, however, insofar as they seek to identify a norm
of inter-state behavior that is immanent in the behavior of one of
the parties to the dispute, rather than to discover and impose a
universal rule for all cases. And both the reverse golden rule and
the golden rule are animated by a desire to avoid strategic or
exploitative behavior by one state toward another—whether it be
the affected state trying to foist expensive control requirements on
its neighbors that it is not prepared to shoulder itself; or the
source state trying to dump pollution on its neighbors that it
would not tolerate in its own backyard. It remains to be seen
whether the two golden rules can be synthesized into a general
approach to transboundary pollution disputes, and if so whether
this approach might be a more promising legal norm than the
current consensus favoring a universal norm of strict liability.305
V. THE CASE FOR THE GOLDEN RULES
The great virtue of the golden rules is that they allow us to
identify norms for resolving transboundary pollution disputes re-
flected in the conduct of the parties to each dispute. There is no
need to identify a “one size fits all” rule that must govern both a
dispute between Switzerland and France over pollution of Lake
Geneva and a dispute between Bangladesh and India over pollu-
tion of the River Ganges. The golden rules do this by exploiting a
feature of transboundary pollution not shared by private nuisance
305. Another possible source of analogical support for the reverse golden rule and the
golden rule might be the Supreme Court’s decisions applying the dormant Commerce
Clause doctrine to strike down state rules that discriminate against out-of-state waste. See
C&A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383 (1994); Oregon Waste Sys., Inc.
v. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality, 511 U.S. 93 (1994); Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v.
Michigan Dept. of Nat. Resources, 504 U.S. 353 (1992); Chemical Waste Management,
Inc. v. Hunt, 504 U.S. 334 (1992); City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617
(1978). To be sure, because imported waste is already the subject of a commercial con-
tract, it is easier to regulate than air and water pollution that crosses state lines. See
supra note 184. But if we view imported waste as being akin to incoming air and water
pollution, then the Court’s decisions can be seen as adopting a kind of reverse golden
rule. The affected state obviously permits the generation and disposal of positive quan-
tities of waste within its own borders, but it is insisting of a higher standard (no importa-
tion of waste) from its neighbors. Alternatively, we can view state approved and licensed
waste disposal facilities as a type of environmental control measure. On this view, the
affected state may be seen as violating the golden rule, because it makes such facilities
available to its own citizens, but not to the citizens of neighboring states. (I am indebted
to David Dana for this point).
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disputes. Private nuisance disputes share many of the same struc-
tural features as transboundary pollution disputes; they are, for
example, highly conflictual. But in transboundary disputes the
disputants are not only parties; they are also regulators with re-
spect to analogous disputes that arise within their own territory.
The golden rules draw upon the parties’ behavior as regulators
with respect to their own citizens in order to identify the appropri-
ate norms for resolving their disputes with their neighbors.
A. How the Golden Rules Might Operate
Synthesizing the two golden rules into a single norm would
not seem to present a conceptual difficulty. Both parties would be
free to invoke either rule. The affected state, assumed to be the
plaintiff, could invoke either the source state’s norms of internal
governance (under the golden rule) or its own internal norms of
governance (under the reverse golden rule) as a standard for hold-
ing the source state responsible for transboundary pollution. Like-
wise, the source state, assumed to be the defendant, could cite
either the affected state’s internal norms (under the reverse golden
rule) or its own internal norms (under the golden rule) as a de-
fense against being held responsible.
I will not attempt to deduce a complete code of conduct for
implementing the golden rules concept. Indeed, any such effort
would be contrary to the spirit of the rules, which is to allow
norms to emerge from the evolving internal practices of the parties
with respect to different pollution problems. Nevertheless, a few
observations about how one might resolve the more prominent
questions arising under this approach are probably in order.
The first and most obvious question is what to do if there are
conflicting golden rules—as well might happen if both the golden
rule and the reverse golden rule can be invoked by either party.
The answer would seem to be that we would proceed as we do in
a typical appellate argument where the parties rely on conflicting
authorities. The tribunal—or more likely in the international con-
text, the parties in bilateral negotiations—would attempt to deter-
mine which of the two authorities is most closely on point. A
variety of contextual factors would be relevant in making this
determination: the nature of the pollutant in question; the amount
of pollution and the pathways of exposure; the costs and benefits
of controls in different circumstances, and so forth.
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The process would presumably unfold in a dialogic fashion,
much like an appellate argument: the plaintiff state would cite a
particular internal practice of one of the contending states as a
“precedent” for liability; the source state would point out features
distinguishing this practice from the present controversy, and per-
haps would cite an alternative internal practice which it would
argue is a “precedent” more closely on point; the plaintiff state
would then attempt to rehabilitate the original internal practice
that it relied upon and distinguish the source state’s alternative
practice. The tribunal, if there is one, would have to determine
which internal practice provides the more persuasive analogy to
the dispute at hand, and presumably would cite reasons in support
of its choice. If there is no tribunal, the parties would seek to
persuade each other as to which internal practice provides the
better benchmark.
A second question is whether the internal norms that can be
invoked by the parties are the official norms of a state or the
norms as they are actually enforced. In principle, it would seem
clear that the relevant standard should be the actual practice of a
state.306 This standard represents the true judgment of one of the
parties as to how the balance should be struck between the bene-
fits and costs of regulation. Official norms may be disregarded or
may be treated as largely aspirational;307 it would be inconsistent
with the logic of the golden rules to impose such a norm on an-
other state if that norm is not actually followed.
One drawback of looking to actual practice rather than official
norms, of course, is that this opens the door to a much more
intensive—and expensive—factual investigation. As in private liti-
gation, however, the amount the parties are willing to spend on
factual investigations will be a function of how much is at stake. If
there is not much at stake, the parties might be content to cite the
official norms. Questions will also arise about what to do if one
306. By focusing on state practice rather than declarative law, the golden rules would
represent a reversion to the older conception of customary international law as norms
reflected in the conventional practices of states. See Bodansky, supra note 133, at 108–12.
307. For example, in the debates leading up to the Mexico-United States side agree-
ments on the environment agreed to as a condition for the ratification of NAFTA, Mexi-
can environmental law was characterized as being substantively similar to United States
environmental law; the difference between the two nations was said to be that Mexican
environmental law is generally not enforced to the same degree as American law. But see
Charnovitz, supra note 2, at 280 (suggesting that this characterization is overly simplistic).
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party bars another from obtaining discovery about the record of
actual enforcement in another state. A possible solution to this
problem would be to adopt presumptions that work against a state
that denies discovery or otherwise frustrates an investigation into
its enforcement practices by another state.308 In effect, a state
that denies discovery would be deemed either to enforce or not to
enforce a norm—whichever construction was against its interest in
the dispute.
A third question relates to the range of issues covered by the
golden rules. Clearly the rules would be used to establish the stan-
dard of care. Arid debates about strict liability versus fault would
be replaced with an examination of whether the release of a par-
ticular quantity of a particular pollutant in particular circumstances
triggers a regulatory response under the internal norms of one of
the states. The same follows for questions about the standard for
establishing causation and the quantum of harm that must be
shown. These questions would be resolved not in terms of abstract
formulas but by an examination of the actual domestic practices of
the parties. And there is no reason in principle why the golden
rules could not also govern the question of relief. If a state limits
private nuisance plaintiffs to damages rather than injunctive relief
under certain circumstances, then the golden rules would limit the
transboundary plaintiff to damages rather than injunctive relief.
Finally, as the OECD Principles suggest,309 the golden rules can
even be extended to questions of procedure, such as the type of
hearing rights that complaining parties are entitled to receive.
Of course, the golden rules can do no more than establish the
content of the legal norms that apply to a given dispute. They do
not obviate the need to prove that the source state in fact can be
shown (with the requisite clarity) to have caused harm (of the
requisite severity) in the affected state, and that one of the in-
volved states would under similar circumstances in its domestic law
provide relief (of the designated type). Disagreements about the
facts, however, exist under any system of liability or negotiation.
308. Thus, under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, one sanction available for
failing to permit discovery is an order establishing that the matter as to which discovery
was sought “shall be taken to be established for the purposes of the action in accordance
with the claim of the party obtaining the order.” FED. R. CIV. P. 37(b)(2)(A); see also
FED. R. CIV. P. 36(a) (establishing that failure to respond or object to request for admis-
sion within designated time means the matter is admitted).
309. See supra notes 302–04 and accompanying text.
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B. Comparing the Golden Rules to Strict Liability
We have already seen how the current official norm governing
transboundary pollution disputes—strict liability for causing signifi-
cant harm in another state—may work to frustrate negotiated
solutions to transboundary pollution disputes. As it operates in
practice, this norm renders the outcome of disputes unpredictable,
creates opportunities for the parties to take extreme and threaten-
ing positions toward each other, and encourages parties to conceal
rather than disclose private information about their true preferenc-
es.310 There is reason to believe that the golden rules would do
better on all scores.
Consider first the predictability of the rules. The strict liability
regime is unpredictable largely because its abstract formulation is
very different from its actual implementation. Of course, the con-
tent of the rule could be made more predictable if there were a
large volume of adjudicated transboundary pollution controversies
in which the strict liability rule was actually applied to specific
factual circumstances.311 But there are virtually no adjudicated
transboundary pollution controversies, so the status of the rule re-
mains ambiguous. Moreover, the uncertain content of the rule, in
combination with the structural impediments to collective action,
works to frustrate the emergence of an active tradition of adjudi-
cations that would allow us to break out of the circle.
The golden rules replace the abstract strict liability formula
with what is in effect a question of fact: what is the actual practice
of the involved states when a similar problem arises as a matter of
internal governance? Naturally, there will be disagreements about
which internal practice represents the best analogy to the trans-
boundary conflict, and about the actual content of the internal
practice. But now the applicable law is determined by real world
institutional referents, subject to investigation (by both sides), and
subject to the proffer and counter proffer of argument and evi-
dence. If the two sides disagree sharply about what the applicable
legal norms are, there is an alternative to the black box of going
to trial: they can gather more evidence. Even if they do not reach
an agreement, it is reasonable to assume that the process of
adopting norms from existing practices will generate a narrower
310. See supra Part III.
311. See Landes & Posner, supra note 253, at 271.
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range of disagreement than the process of attempting to predict
the application of abstractions.
We also saw how the strict liability norm creates opportunities
for the parties to take hard bargaining positions that can frustrate
negotiated solutions.312 Strict liability exacerbates the inherently
conflictual nature of transboundary pollution disputes: it is
threatening to the source state, because it suggests the possibility
that the source state will be forced to take very expensive abate-
ment measures or incur large financial obligations for the benefit
of persons living in another jurisdiction. But strict liability is also
threatening to the affected state, because the rule defined by actu-
al practice appears to be that there is no effective sanction against
transboundary pollution at all.
The golden rules would work to defuse the conflictual nature
of transboundary pollution disputes, rather than exacerbate them.
It is essentially a norm of reciprocity. The plaintiff state is not
asking for special treatment, only that the defendant state respect
a judgment that either the plaintiff or the defendant itself has
already made and enforced on itself. The golden rules also mini-
mize the range of possible outcomes, and thus reduce the possibili-
ties for taking hard bargaining positions. It is unlikely that either
state will have undertaken control measures that entail costs wildly
out of proportion with benefits, or that the defendant state might
regard as oppressive and unreasonable. Conversely, if the plaintiff
state has genuine grievances, it is unlikely that both states will
have completely ignored similar problems when they have arisen
internally.
Finally, we have seen that the rule of strict liability encourag-
es parties to conceal private information for strategic advan-
tage.313 A key problem in the regulation of transboundary pollu-
tion is that the source state has an incentive to externalize the
costs of pollution, and the affected state has an incentive to exter-
nalize the costs of regulation. In these circumstances, it is very
difficult to get an accurate bead on how either of the parties truly
values the costs and benefits of regulation. The strict liability norm
compounds the problem by creating an incentive for the affected
state to exaggerate its damages, and for the source state to deny
all causal responsibility.
312. See supra notes 254–56 and accompanying text.
313. See supra notes 257–59 and accompanying text.
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The golden rules help overcome these problems by adopting
as the benchmark the balance of costs and benefits that one of the
states has already struck when dealing with similar problems with-
in its own jurisdiction. When faced with a pollution problem as a
matter of internal governance, a state must strike a balance be-
tween the costs and benefits of regulation under circumstances
where both sides of the ledger must be considered. Thus, the actu-
al practice of a state when dealing with such a problem is likely to
reflect a more candid appraisal of both the benefits and costs than
can be obtained by asking only the source state or only the affect-
ed state what they think about these values.
C. Two Applications
The superior capacity of the golden rules to reach satisfactory
resolutions of transboundary pollution disputes can be illustrated
by briefly considering two prominent cases where a norm of strict
liability arguably has been applied. Consider, first, how Georgia v.
Tennessee Copper Co.314 might have been resolved under the
golden rules. Recall that the Tennessee Supreme Court had previ-
ously ruled that the fumes from the smelters were a nuisance as a
matter of Tennessee law.315 Based on this prior determination,
the U.S. Supreme Court could have resolved the case on the basis
of the golden rule, reasoning that where a source state has deter-
mined that pollution is unlawful when directed at its own citizens,
it necessarily follows that the same pollution is unlawful when
directed at persons in a neighboring state.
Of course, the pollution that the Tennessee Supreme Court
deemed to be a nuisance was produced by a different method of
roasting ore, and the Tennessee plaintiffs may have lived in great-
er proximity to the fumes than did many of the Georgia vic-
tims.316 It is not implausible to assume, however, that the judg-
ment of the Tennessee court, reached as a matter of internal Ten-
nessee law, would end up being the case involving facts most
similar to the transboundary pollution of which Georgia com-
plained. That “precedent” would suggest that the copper smelters
were guilty as charged of committing a transboundary nuisance. So
314. 206 U.S. 230 (1907).
315. See supra notes 52–53 and accompanying text.
316. See supra text accompanying notes 54–56.
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far, the golden rules would produce the same outcome as the one
reached by the Court.
With respect to the question of remedy, however, the golden
rules would point to a different result. Tennessee had not only de-
termined that the sulfur fumes were a nuisance, it had also de-
termined that damages were the proper remedy, rather than in-
junctive relief.317 Assuming as before that Tennessee’s determina-
tion turned out to be the most factually similar case in construct-
ing the appropriate relief, then the golden rules would suggest that
the Supreme Court should also have awarded damages to Georgia
for the transboundary pollution.318 In effect, the Tennessee Su-
preme Court’s weighing of competing interests in determining the
proper relief with respect to its own citizens would be deemed the
best guide as to what relief should be awarded once the contro-
versy became a transboundary dispute.
The wisdom of this approach is arguably confirmed by the
subsequent history of the case. It turned out that Georgia did not
really want the copper smelters shut down. Although located in
Tennessee, the smelters were important to the economy of north-
west Georgia. After the Supreme Court’s initial decision, Georgia
agreed to postpone enforcement of the decree for many years
while additional technological improvements were adopted.319
Later, Georgia entered into a settlement with one smelter calling
for a partial abatement of the pollution and the creation of an
arbitration panel to award compensatory damages to citizens of
Georgia who could show they had sustained harm.320 When one
of the other smelters refused to settle, the Supreme Court even-
tually entered (and then modified) an injunction requiring partial
317. See Madison v. Ducktown Sulphur Copper & Iron Co., 83 S.W. 658, 666–67
(Tenn. 1904).
318. The award should have been given unless there were some reason inherent in a
federal court’s adjudication of the problem that would preclude such relief. See North
Dakota v. Minnesota, 263 U.S. 365, 371–76 (1923) (suggesting that the Eleventh Amend-
ment may preclude the Supreme Court from awarding damages in a transboundary nui-
sance case).
319. See Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 237 U.S. 474, 475 (1915) (describing
lengthy negotiations between the parties, the installation of further control devices, a set-
tlement between Georgia and one of the companies, and authorizing an injunction limit-
ing discharge to twenty tons of sulfur per day during warm season for the nonsettling
company), amended by 237 U.S. 678, 678–79 (1915) (ordering recordkeeping and inspec-
tion of the defendant corporation, as well as requiring defendant to prevent the escape
of fumes with a certain amount of sulphur content).
320. See Tennessee Copper, 237 U.S. at 475–76.
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abatement by this party along the lines agreed to by the settling
smelter.321 Eventually, all parties settled on the basis of partial
control of pollution combined with payment of claims established
by arbitration for any residual damages.322 One can imagine that
an order entered in 1907 awarding temporary damages to all
Georgia residents harmed by the pollution would have achieved
essentially the same result without the need for the Court’s subse-
quent additional relief and modifications of relief between 1907
and 1938 when the case was finally resolved.323
Another prominent dispute that arguably would have been
resolved more satisfactorily under the golden rules is Arkansas v.
Oklahoma.324 In that case, the Court upheld the EPA’s inter-
pretation of the Clean Water Act as permitting an affected state
to block discharges from a source in an upstream state if it can
show that discharges will result in a “detectable violation” of the
affected state’s water quality standards.325 The EPA’s detectable
violation standard, however, ignores all questions about whether
the affected state is in compliance with its own water quality stan-
dards. If an affected state has failed to regulate domestic sources
sufficiently to insure compliance with its own water quality stan-
dards, why should a source in another state be forced to prevent a
“detectable violation” of those same standards?
The problem is that the EPA test is geared to the official
norms of the affected state—its stated water quality stan-
dards—and not to the actual practices of the affected state. Thus,
under the EPA test it would be possible for Oklahoma to demand
321. See id. at 478; Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 240 U.S. 650 (1916), modifying
237 U.S. 474 (1915).
322. See Joint Motion of the State of Georgia and Tennessee Copper Company to
Enter an Order of Dismissal at 5–11, Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230
(1907) (filed October Term, 1937); Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 302 U.S. 660, 660
(1938) (granting joint motion to dismiss); Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 304 U.S.
546, 546 (1938) (vacating all orders and decrees previously entered).
323. The Supreme Court’s injunctions may have had a “technology forcing” effect in
stimulating the smelters to develop new control technologies. See PERCIVAL ET AL., supra
note 291, at 167. But an award of temporary damages, which could be renewed periodi-
cally, would also have provided a powerful incentive for the smelters to develop control
techniques to reduce damages. The prospect of repeated damage payments “will give the
polluter an incentive to develop (or purchase from others) environmentally superior tech-
nologies that permit a greater level of pollution control at lower cost.” PETER S.
MENELL & RICHARD B. STEWART, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY 186 (1994).
324. 503 U.S. 91 (1992).
325. Id. at 94, 107.
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that Arkansas adopt expensive control measures in order to pre-
vent a “detectable violation” of Oklahoma water quality standards,
while Oklahoma itself was violating those standards under similar
circumstances. This would allow Oklahoma to seize the benefits of
environmental controls while exporting the costs to its neighboring
state. The Court was aware of the danger of strategic behavior by
the affected state, and invoked this concern in rejecting the court
of appeals construction of the Act, which (in effect) was strict
liability without any significant harm threshold.326 Nevertheless it
failed to consider that the EPA standard also creates a potential
for strategic behavior.
The golden rules suggest that a better approach to implement-
ing the Clean Water Act would be to ask whether a discharge
from an upstream state will result in a detectable degradation of
existing water quality in the affected state. This approach is simply
an application of the reverse golden rule. Using actual, rather than
official water quality standards as a benchmark water quality in
effect incorporates the affected state’s existing practices into the
norm against which the source state is judged. Adopting actual
water quality as the relevant benchmark eliminates incentives for
cost-exporting behavior; the affected state can ask that the source
state undertake control measures only if it has already done so
itself in analogous circumstances. Thus, the actual water quality
standard is more likely to bring the two states into harmonious
agreement.
D. Progress, Not Panacea
None of this is to deny that the golden rules have their short-
comings. There may be instances where novel forms of trans-
boundary pollution emerge, and neither state has any record of
regulation that can be meaningfully invoked as a standard against
which to assess the transboundary effects. For example, one state
may have many nuclear reactors and lax regulations about radia-
tion leaks; its neighbor may be so alarmed by the thought of radi-
ation leaks that it has never permitted a reactor to be built, and
hence has no regulations on point. Alternatively, two states may
326. See id. at 111 (“If every discharge that had some theoretical impact on a down-
stream State were interpreted as ‘degrading’ the downstream waters, downstream States
might wield an effective veto over upstream discharges.”) See also Oklahoma v. EPA,
908 F.2d 595, 618–20 (10th Cir. 1990) (detailing circuit court’s view).
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have radically different attitudes about certain types of trans-
boundary harms. For instance, one state may be rich and have a
strong preference for environmental controls even at the expense
of economic growth; its neighbor may be poor with a strong pref-
erence for economic growth rather than environmental regulation.
This scenario may in fact describe the United States-Mexican rela-
tionship, with its many transboundary pollution problems.
But the relevant question is not whether the golden rules
generate perfect solutions to every imaginable problem.327 Rath-
er, it is whether the golden rules do a better job of getting us to
satisfactory solutions to transboundary pollution disputes than their
principal rival, the norm of strict liability. In theory, strict liability
may generate better solutions to novel transboundary problems or
to situations involving special sensitivities. But if strict liability can-
not generate an effective regime for collective action, its advantage
will be simply that—theoretical. And there is no reason to think
that a norm of strict liability provides a better accommodation of
interactions between the rich and the poor, like those along the
border between the United States and Mexico. If anything, strict
liability offers an even more one-sided, pro-environmental rule;
that is, a rule likely to be favored by rich nations and resented by
poor nations.328
CONCLUSION
The world’s legal systems have generally failed in their efforts
to find a solution to transboundary pollution. The basic problem is
structural. The harm inflicted by transboundary pollution is re-
duced by the distance it travels, and in more recent times, by
regulatory systems adopted for other purposes that also limit the
level and incidence of transboundary pollution. Transboundary
pollution problems are typically isolated and episodic as well.
Perhaps most importantly, given the highly conflicted interests
involved in a transboundary pollution dispute, the source state has
little incentive to cooperate in forming a legal regime that promis-
es new and onerous burdens for the benefit of the affected state.
327. To demand a standard that produces answers to all conceivable problems is to
commit the nirvana fallacy. See Harold Demsetz, Information and Efficiency: Another
Viewpoint, 12 J.L. & ECON. 1, 1 (1969).
328. See Stewart, supra note 186, at 2080 (noting that states with higher per capita
incomes often prefer stronger environmental controls).
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The most promising strategy for achieving limits on trans-
boundary pollution is contractual. Since typically a small number
of states are involved in a transboundary pollution dispute, and
the states act as representatives of all individuals who are adverse-
ly affected, a bilateral or multilateral agreement is possible. The
principal problem is how to devise the means of providing offset-
ting compensation to the source state as consideration for its
agreement to cooperate in a contractual solution. Such an arrange-
ment will most easily be reached where the transboundary pollu-
tion is partial or reciprocal—as in the case of boundary waters or
acid rain—and where in-kind benefits can be offered as at least
partial consideration.
The content of the legal norms that apply to transboundary
pollution is also relevant in determining how often bilateral and
multilateral agreements can be reached. Just as settlements of law-
suits are influenced by the content of the legal rules to be applied
at trial, parties to a transboundary pollution dispute will be able to
reach an agreement more easily if the rules they assume apply to
such pollution are predictable, create minimal opportunities for
threatening positions, and require the disclosure of private infor-
mation about the parties’ true preferences. The current consensus
view about the norm that ought to apply to transboundary pollu-
tion—a universal rule of strict liability for significant harm—fares
poorly under these criteria, and most likely works in counterpro-
ductive ways to frustrate Coasean bargains.
Fortunately, one does not have to start from scratch in seek-
ing better legal norms. Returning to the font of today’s official
norms—the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction decisions from
the first three decades of this century—one finds that the Court
resolved these cases not in terms of universal abstractions, but
rather in accordance with individualized determinations of equity.
Moreover, the decisions suggest—with a little teasing and some
supplementation with modern international authority—that the
basic norm informing these equitable judgments is one of reciproc-
ity. The source state should treat the affected state the way it
treats its own citizens, and the affected state should demand of the
source state no more than it demands of its own citizens.329
329. Even the venerable maxim sic utere, see supra text accompanying note 115, is
sufficiently ambiguous to stand as authority for the golden rules. A number of older
nuisance cases refer to the maxim as incorporating the basic idea of the golden rule. See,
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These golden rules provide the basis for a different conception of
the legal regime, one that is more predictable, less threatening,
and more likely to lead to the disclosure of the parties’ true pref-
erences.
Would a new legal regime based on the golden rules solve all
transboundary pollution problems? Most problems of trans-
boundary pollution will continue to evade a solution, unless they
get much worse or the cost of creating legal institutions drops
significantly. There is reason to believe, however, that the golden
rules would establish a background understanding more successful
at facilitating bilateral and multilateral agreements than a universal
norm of strict liability. The promise of the golden rules is that
they would do a better job of encouraging contractual bargaining
between states, where progress is most likely to be achieved. That
is probably all one can ask of a legal norm in dealing with what
may be environmental law’s most vexing dilemma.
e.g., Waschak v. Moffat, 109 A.2d 310, 321–22 (Pa. 1954) (Musmanno, J., dissenting);
Beam v. Birmingham Slag Co., 10 So. 2d 162, 166 (Ala. 1942); Coakley v. Ajuria, 290 P.
33, 35 (Cal. 1930); Akers v. Mathieson Alkali Works, 144 S.E. 492, 495 (Va. 1928).
